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ABSTRACT 
 
In this research report the South African taxation of carried interest in a private equity context is 
examined.  The extent to which reform of that taxation should be considered is also presented in 
this report. 
 
The nature of carried interest in the South African private equity context is initially examined. 
Thereafter, a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and related South 
African case law that would likely apply to the taxation of carried interest is set out.  
 
An analysis and determination of how appropriate and adequate the taxing provisions and 
relevant principles from case law are in the taxation of carried interest is provided.  A 
recommendation for new legislation to deal with the taxation of carried interest has also been 
made. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
According to Hale (2007: 5), private equity can be defined as: 
 ‘equity financing of unquoted companies at many stages in the life of the company, from start-
up to expansion, to management buy-outs and buy-ins of established companies.’  
 
What sets private equity investments apart from other types of investments is the focus on 
unlisted or unquoted companies, the nature of capital used (that is, equity), the investment 
horizon or period (that is, medium to long term) as well as the types of companies it targets 
(that is, companies with high growth potential) (Hale, 2007: 5).  
 
The private equity industry in South Africa is among the most established in emerging 
markets with fund types that vary by stage of investment, size and sector specialisation. 
With respect to the size of the South African industry, at the end of 2013 (the most recent 
year for which data is available), the industry employed 741 investment professionals who 
managed a total of R162,2 billion of assets. Further, the South African industry has 
achieved a compound annual growth rate of 11,8% of total funds under management since 
1999 when the South African Venture Capital Association and KPMG survey began. 
(KPMG and SAVCA, 2014: 21.)  
 
A private equity fund functions as an investment portfolio comprising a number of investee 
companies (Dyer, 2011: 7).  More specifically, a private equity fund is normally 
constituted as a partnership which is managed by the fund’s general partner.  The general 
partner, amongst other things, identifies and evaluates investment opportunities and raises 
capital to create the fund. This capital is then deployed by the general partner to acquire 
investments in a portfolio of companies.  Thereafter, the general partner is typically 
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responsible for monitoring and realising those investments on behalf of the fund. (Elson 
and Weld 2007: 46 and Dauds, 2007: 10.) 
 
 The bulk of the fund’s capital is sourced from the limited partners (typically institutional 
investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, development finance institutions 
as well as charitable foundations with large endowments and high net worth individuals) 
who are typically passive investors in the fund (Elson and Weld, 2007: 46). 
 
Most usually, the limited partners require the general partner to make a capital contribution 
as a co-investment into the fund - albeit a substantially smaller amount than that 
contributed by the limited partners.  This co-investment is made to demonstrate the 
commitment and belief of the general partner to the success of the fund.  In other words, 
the requirement for the general partner to put its own financial capital at risk, by co-
investing in the fund, ensures that the interest of the general partner from an investment 
perspective is aligned with that of the limited partners. (Dauds, 2007: 10 and Horak, 2007: 
3.)   
 
Private equity investment is a transformational, value added, active investment strategy 
and to this end the general partner has as its strategic objective the achievement of a target 
return for the portfolio companies in which it invests within a certain risk level and within 
a certain investment time frame (Dyer, 2011: 7). 
 
Carried interest is typically derived by the general partner in the form of a disproportionate 
share of the sales proceeds realised upon disposal of investments by the private equity fund 
(Modise et al, 2014: 281).  More particularly, the general partner is typically entitled to 
20% of the fund’s realisation profits, notwithstanding that the general partner contributes 
only 1% to 2% of the fund’s investment capital (Dauds, 2008: 10-11).  It is important to 
note, however, that the distribution of carried interest is only made once all the fund 
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investors’ capital has been returned to them and a minimum return on the fund 
investment(s) disposed of has been achieved (Missankov, Van Dyk , Van Biljon, Hayes , 
Van der Veen, 2006: 24-25).  
 
For some years now, the tax treatment of carried interest has been the focus of significant 
attention from tax authorities, market players and the media in several countries such as the 
US and the UK (Garcia, 2008: 209).  The argument advanced by a number of 
commentators in these jurisdictions – where carried interest has always been taxed as a 
capital gain – is that carried interest is in substance a form of deferred compensation / 
remuneration for services rendered by private equity fund managers that should be subject 
to the same (a greater) tax burden as other types of service fees / remuneration (Braeken, 
2012: 3). 
 
In South Africa, this argument is particularly relevant given the significant differential in 
effective tax rates that would apply to carried interest characterised as gross income for 
services rendered or to be rendered in terms of paragraph (c) of the gross income 
definition
1
 in section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962
2
 as opposed to characterisation 
as a capital gain.  
 
Further, in South Africa, establishing the appropriate timing of the taxation of private 
equity carried interest is an important consideration.  This is because the right to carried 
interest, if shown to be in respect of services to be rendered by the general partner to the 
limited partners, could be taxed upfront, when the private equity fund is established, in 
terms of paragraph (c).  More particularly, should the right to carried interest constitute an 
amount that accrues to the general partner at fund inception, in respect of services to be 
rendered, then paragraph (c) would apply thereto which would require inclusion of the 
market value of this right in gross income of the general partner, at fund inception.  
                                                     
1
 Hereafter referred to as ‘paragraph (c)’ 
2
 Any references to sections, paragraphs and schedules in this report refer to the Income Tax Act unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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Upfront taxation of the right to carried interest could impose a significant tax burden on the 
general partner who would not have received the carried interest distribution to fund the 
tax due. 
 
In National Treasury’s 2008 Budget Review it was stated (at 70) that: 
‘…the tax treatment of management carried interest (reward for fund managers in the form of 
shares/equity) will be investigated. Given the complexities involved, a discussion document will 
be developed to raise options and elicit public comment.’    
 
Despite this statement, at the time of writing, no such discussion document has been 
issued. Further, as South African tax legislation contains no special provisions regulating 
the taxation of private equity carried interest, the tax consequences for private equity fund 
managers – both upon awarding of the right to carried interest when the private equity fund 
is formed and several years later upon its distribution to them – is unclear. 
 
Accordingly, this report will seek to provide greater clarity and understanding of the South 
African tax implications of private equity carried interest in the hands of the general 
partner of a South African private equity fund by determining its appropriate 
characterisation and by assessing which provisions of the Act and which case law 
principles would likely apply to the taxation thereof.  Further, in instances where the study 
identifies shortcomings in the South African taxation of private equity carried interest, 
appropriate recommendations for taxation reform will be made. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
1.2 The research problem 
 
1.2.1 The statement of the problem 
 
This research will evaluate the appropriateness and adequacy of South African taxation of 
carried interest in the private equity context and examine in what respects reform thereof 
should be considered. 
 
1.2.2 The sub-problems: 
 
The first sub-problem 
 
The first sub-problem is to examine the nature of carried interest in a private equity 
context. 
The second sub-problem 
 
The second sub-problem is to discuss and scrutinise the relevant provisions of the Income 
Tax Act and related South African case law that would likely apply to taxing private equity 
carried interest in South Africa. 
The third sub-problem 
 
The third sub-problem is to analyse and determine how appropriate and adequate these 
taxing provisions and relevant case law principles are in the South African taxation of 
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private equity carried interest
3
 and to make recommendations for reform thereof where the 
law is found wanting 
 
1.3 Research methodology  
 
The research method to be followed will be a qualitative approach. 
 
To this end, journal articles, academic working papers, books, theses, domestic tax 
legislation and cases pertaining to the subject will be reviewed in order to: 
 Understand the private equity business model and the typical way in which private 
equity funds are structured in South Africa. 
 Understand what carried interest is, how carried interest arrangements typically 
operate in the private equity context as well as the economic arrangement that 
exists among the parties to the carried interest arrangement. 
 Establish the South African taxing provisions and related South African case law 
principles that would likely apply to taxing carried interest in South Africa. 
 To determine how appropriate and adequate current South African law is in taxing 
carried interest. 
 Provide possible recommendations for reform where current South African law is 
found to be deficient in taxing carried interest. 
 
1.4 Scope and limitations 
 
This research seeks, inter alia, to examine and discuss the likely income tax consequences 
of the right to carried interest and the distribution of carried interest with reference to the 
structure – as depicted in Figure 1 of Chapter 2 – of a typical South African tax resident 
                                                     
3
 Hereafter referred to as ‘carried interest’ 
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private equity fund, which has investments in portfolio companies that are tax resident in 
South Africa. 
 
Further, this structure assumes that the private equity management company as well as the 
general partner are both South African tax resident companies with the related services 
being rendered in South Africa by South African tax resident key executives and 
employees of both these entities.  In addition, it is assumed that the shares acquired by the 
private equity fund in portfolio companies are equity shares as defined in section 1 of the 
Act. 
 
To this end, the following are considered outside the scope of the research report: 
 Evaluating the Value-Added Tax effects of the management fee and the right to and 
distribution of carried interest; and 
 Examining the income tax consequences for the limited partners of the private 
equity fund, arising from the carried interest arrangement entered into with the 
general partner. 
 
Moreover, the possible application of the general anti-avoidance rules, contained in 
sections 80A-80L of the Act, to any of the transactions within the structure depicted in 
Figure 1 of Chapter 2, is considered beyond the scope of this report. 
 
1.5 Organisation of report 
 
An introduction to the report, a statement of the research problem, the scope and 
limitations of the report, as well as an overview of the report’s organisation is provided in 
chapter 1.  
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By way of a diagram depicting a commonly used structure for a South African private 
equity fund and carried interest arrangement and explanation thereof, chapter 2 will 
provide an in depth analysis of what carried interest is, how carried interest arises and how 
carried interest arrangements operate in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 3 will first determine the tax consequences for the general partner of the right to 
carried interest and the distribution of carried interest that flow from the legal form of a 
typical carried interest arrangement as depicted in Figure 1 of chapter 2.  Thereafter, it will 
be determined to what extent, in legal substance, a carried interest arrangement, as depicted 
in Figure 1 of chapter 2, is a fee arrangement in which the general partner is compensated 
for fund management services rendered / to be rendered to the limited partners by being 
awarded the right to, and the distribution of carried interest.  The chapter will conclude by 
discussing and analysing, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement, as 
depicted in Figure 1 of chapter 2, the applicable case law and the relevant provisions of the 
Act that will apply both to the taxation of the right and to the taxation of the distribution of 
carried interest.  
 
Chapter 4 will first analyse how appropriate and adequate the South African income tax 
provisions and related case law principles are – as discussed in chapter 3 – for the purposes 
of taxing private equity carried interest, based on the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement, as depicted in Figure 1 of Chapter 2.  Thereafter, having identified any 
shortcomings in the law, a recommendation for reform thereof will be made. 
 
Chapter 5 will provide a summary of the findings in relation to the research problem. 
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2 An examination of a private equity carried interest 
arrangement 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In order to be able to examine the South African tax legislation and related case law that 
would likely apply to carried interest, as is done in chapter 3 of this report, it is important 
to have a comprehensive understanding of carried interest in the context of South African 
private equity. 
 
To this end, by way of a diagram depicting a commonly used structure for a South African 
private equity fund and carried interest arrangement and explanation thereof, this chapter 
will provide an in depth analysis of what carried interest is, how carried interest arises and 
how carried interest arrangements operate in South Africa. 
More particularly, in this chapter: 
 the legal structures typically used for a South African  private equity fund will be 
examined; 
 the major private equity participants and in broad terms what their respective roles 
are in the formation and operation of a South African private equity fund will be 
discussed; and 
 a typical fee and carried interest arrangement in a South African private equity fund 
will be scrutinised. 
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2.2 A typical South African private equity fund structure and carried 
interest arrangement  
 
2.2.1 Diagrammatic illustration of fund structure and carried interest arrangement 
 
Based on discussions with several persons active in the South African private equity 
industry, a review of a private equity fund partnership agreement and a private equity 
structure memorandum obtained from a large South African commercial law firm, a typical 
structure for a private equity fund, private equity transaction and carried interest 
arrangement in South Africa is as depicted in Figure 1
4
 and as discussed below in 2.2.2 .  
FIGURE 1 – PRIVATE EQUITY FUND STRUCTURE  
                           
                                                   
100% shareholding 
                                                              
               Management  fee: 
                                                                                                                         2% of fund capital 
   
                         1-2% capital contribution                                                                                              
                               
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  
                              98%-99% capital contribution   
 
 
  
                                                             
 disposal                 
  
                                                     
4 Further corroboration for certain elements of the Figure 1 structure was obtained from various literature reviewed. 
Reference to the specific literature reviewed has been made in the explanation of the Figure 1 structure below. 
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2.2.2 Explanation of Figure 1 Structure 
 
A private equity fund serves as a vehicle to pool large amounts of capital from various 
investors to be invested in several target investee companies, known as portfolio 
companies (refer Figure 1). In South Africa, a private equity fund is usually organised as a 
limited partnership (Hayes et al, 2006: 16). More precisely, an en commandite partnership 
fund structure (as illustrated in Figure 1) is used; where a partnership is created between 
various limited partners (the external investors in Figure 1) and a general partner (refer 
Figure 1).  
 
The general partner acts as the disclosed partner for the en commandite partnership and as 
such, notably has unlimited liability for the obligations of the en commandite partnership 
to third parties. In contrast to the general partner, the liability of the limited partners for the 
debts of the en commandite partnership is limited to their capital contributions, provided 
that their identities are not disclosed and they remain passive investors in the private equity 
fund (SAVCA, 2015: 39.)  
 
Furthermore, the general partner serves as the private equity fund manager (Missankov et 
al, 2006: 16) and is responsible for the identification, evaluation and negotiation of 
investment opportunities and the monitoring and realisation of those investments for the 
private equity fund (Dauds, 2008: 10).  The general partner is also responsible for 
administrative tasks of the fund such as preparing and approving investment agreements, 
maintaining the fund’s accounting records, preparing the annual financial statements of the 
fund and preparing periodic reports and valuations of the fund’s assets which are furnished 
to the limited partners.  It is understood from discussions with various private equity fund 
managers as well as tax practitioners that deal extensively with private equity transactions 
that most often, no fee would be paid to the general partner for fund management services 
performed.   
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The general partner ordinarily – on behalf of the private equity fund5 – appoints a private 
equity management company (PE ManCo in Figure 1), of which the general partner is a 
wholly owned subsidiary, and to which the general partner delegates / outsources certain of 
its functions, tasks and duties. In this regard, PE ManCo usually provides various 
investment, advisory and administrative services to the private equity fund, for which PE 
ManCo – as illustrated in Figure 1 – receives an arm’s length management fee of typically 
2% of the private equity fund’s annual value (Field 2007: 27). 
 
It is important to note that the general partner, as opposed to PE ManCo, will always be 
responsible and accountable for the overall management and control of the business 
activities and affairs of the fund. As part of its remit, PE ManCo may research possible 
investment opportunities for the fund and may make recommendations to the general 
partner regarding investment acquisitions and disposals. In this regard, however, invariably 
it is the general partner’s prerogative as the fund manager to act on and execute any such 
recommendations. 
 
The limited partners ordinarily provide 98% to 99% (as per Figure 1) of the total capital 
contributed to the private equity fund and typically require the general partner (refer Figure 
1) to contribute the remaining 1% to 2% of capital to the private equity fund. The rationale 
for the aforementioned capital co-investment by the general partner is to ensure that the 
interests of the general partners from an investment perspective are aligned with those of 
the limited partners. (Dauds, 2008: 10-11.)   
 
When a fund disposes of an investment in a portfolio company, (refer portfolio company A 
in Figure 1) the realisation proceeds from such disposal are ordinarily not paid to the 
general and limited partners in proportion to each party’s respective capital contribution 
made to the fund. This is because, at the time of launch of the fund
6
, when fund terms are 
negotiated, typically, the general partner is contractually entitled, upon the future disposal 
                                                     
5 Hereafter referred to as ‘the fund’ 
6
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the fund’s inception’ 
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of a portfolio company by the fund, to receive a disproportionately larger share of the 
portfolio company disposal proceeds, most frequently 20% (Missankov et al, 2006: 25) 
despite having contributed only 1% to 2% of the capital of the fund (Refer Figure 1).  It is 
this share of realisation proceeds i.e. 20% of realisation proceeds received by the general 
partner which is disproportionate to the 1% to 2% capital contribution that that the general 
partner makes, that represents the general partner’s carried interest (Dauds, 2008: 10-11).7  
 
It is important to note, however, that the distribution of carried interest will typically only 
be received by the general partner provided that: 
 first, all the capital contributions made have been returned to all the private equity 
fund investors, being both the general and limited partners, and; 
 second, a specified return on investment has been achieved for all the fund 
investors, being both the general and limited partners; this preferred return is 
known as ‘the hurdle’. (Missankov et al, 2006: 24-25.) 
 
The distribution of carried interest is shown in the following illustrative example: 
Illustrative example 1: Distribution of carried interest 
Suppose the general partner and limited partners in Figure 1 make capital contributions of 
R2 and R98 respectively to the fund in Figure 1.  This R100 is in turn used by the fund to 
acquire a 100% shareholding in year 1 in portfolio company A in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
                                                     
7
 For purposes of this report, the general partner’s entitlement, at the inception of the private equity fund, to receive 
carried interest distributions in the future will be referred to as the general partner’s ‘right to carried interest’. When 
carried interest is paid to the general partner, this will be referred to as ‘the distribution of carried interest’. Further when 
reference in the report is only made to ‘carried interest’ this is a collective term that refers both to the ‘right to carried 
interest’ and ‘the distribution of carried interest’. 
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In terms of the partnership agreement, the general partner shares in 20% percent of the 
proceeds realised on disposal of portfolio company A only once: 
 the R100 of capital contributions made have been repaid to all the fund investors; 
and 
 all the fund investors have achieved a compound annual growth rate on capital 
invested in portfolio company A of 12% -the hurdle rate of return. 
 
Further, suppose that the private equity fund in Figure 1 disposes of its entire shareholding 
in portfolio company A in Figure 1 at the end of year 5 for R300.  
Based on the above facts, at the end of year 5, the realisation proceeds will be allocated 
and distributed by the private equity fund in Figure 1 to its general and limited partners as 
tabulated below: 
TABLE 1 – ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REALISATION PROCEEDS TO FUND 
INVESTORS 
 Allocation and 
distribution type 
General partner Limited partners TOTAL 
Return of capital 
contributions 
R2 
 
R98 R100 
Hurdle return R2
8
 R75
9
 R77 
Residual realisation 
proceeds allocated 
R25
10 
(R123 x 20%) R98
11
 (R123 x 80%) R123 (R300 – R177) 
Total realisation 
proceeds allocated 
 R29 (R2+ R2 +R25) R271 (R98 +R75+ R98) R300 
Allocation of 
residual realisation 
proceeds in 
proportion to capital 
contributed to fund 
R2,50 (rounded) 
12
 R120,50 (R123- R2,50) R123 
Distribution of 
carried interest 
R22,5 (R25- R2.5)            N/A R22,5 
                                                     
8
 Calculated as follows on financial calculator:  -2 PV; 5 n; 12 i, COMP FV = R4 (rounded) – R2 = R2 
9
 Calculated as follows on financial calculator:  -98 PV; 5 n; 12 i, COMP FV = R173 (rounded) – R98= R75  
10
 Rounded 
11
 Rounded 
12
 Calculated as follows: 123 x 2/100 
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As tabulated above, R22,5 constitutes the distribution of carried interest, at the end of 
year 5, received by the general partner. Put differently, of the total residual realisation 
proceeds of the fund, 18% (22,5/123) is allocated to the general partner as the distribution 
of carried interest 
 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it was evident based on discussions with several persons active in the South 
African private equity industry, a review of a private equity fund partnership agreement 
and a private equity structure memorandum obtained from a large South African 
commercial law firm that private equity funds in South Africa most often take the form of 
an en commandite partnership, which partnership acquires investments in various portfolio 
companies (refer Figure 1). It was further discussed that there are two types of investor in 
South African private equity funds, each with very different economic roles; namely: 
 the limited partners who contribute the bulk, that is, 98% - 99% (as per Figure 1) of 
the fund’s capital (Dauds, 2008: 10-11).  The liability of these limited partners for 
debts of the fund is capped at their capital contributions, provided that they remain 
passive investors and their identities are not disclosed (SAVCA, 2015: 39);  and 
 the general partner, a company, which serves as the fund manager and which 
contributes significantly less capital, typically only 1% - 2%, (refer Figure 1) to the 
fund (Missankov et al, 2006: 16 and Dauds, 2008: 10-11).  In sharp contrast to the 
limited partners, the general partner is the disclosed partner, and therefore bears 
unlimited liability risk in respect of fund debts (SAVCA, 2015: 39).  Moreover, 
unlike the limited partners, the general partner takes an active role in managing the 
fund and is typically responsible for the identification, evaluation and negotiation 
of investment opportunities and the monitoring and realisation of those investments 
for the fund (Dauds, 2008: 10).  Notably, based on discussions with various private 
equity fund managers as well as tax practitioners that deal extensively with private 
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equity transactions, most often, no fee is paid to the general partner for any fund 
management services performed.   
 
 
It was further discussed that a typical South African private equity fund will also have a 
fund management company, (PE ManCo in Figure 1), which owns 100% of the general 
partner and which is appointed by the general partner to perform for the fund, various 
investment, advisory and administrative services delegated to it by the general partner.  
Notably, the fund management company, unlike the general partner, is remunerated for its 
services rendered to the fund, by way of an annual management fee, typically 2% of the 
fund’s annual value (Field 2007: 27). 
 
Furthermore, it was shown that a typical private equity carried interest arrangement in 
South Africa operates on the basis that the general partner receives, as the distribution of 
carried interest, a disproportionate share of the portfolio company realisation proceeds 
(typically 20%), despite having contributed only 1% - 2% of the fund’s capital, provided 
certain performance conditions have been met (Dauds, 2008: 10-11 and Missankov et al, 
2006: 24-25). 
 
In conclusion the detailed examination in this chapter of a private equity carried interest 
arrangement in South Africa reveals an arrangement in which the general partner performs 
a multitude of fund management services yet receives no remuneration therefor.  At the 
same time, the general partner receives an enhanced return on its investment in the fund by 
receiving a disproportionate share of fund realisation proceeds, namely the distribution of 
carried interest. The pertinent question to ask then is why such a disproportionate share of 
fund proceeds is awarded to the general partner, if not as a reward (that is, a fee) for 
services rendered.  This question is examined in detail in the following chapter. 
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3 The analysis of South African tax legislation and case law 
applicable to private equity carried interest 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the second sub-problem of this research, namely to discuss and 
analyse the provisions of the Act and associated case law that would likely apply to the 
taxation of carried interest in South Africa. 
 
To this end, the chapter will first discuss the legal form of a carried interest arrangement as 
depicted in Figure 1 of chapter 2 and the tax consequences that flow from the legal form of 
a carried interest arrangement.  In this respect, the applicability of the following taxation 
provisions will be discussed and analysed: 
 Section 9C read with the Eighth Schedule;  
 Paragraph 36 of the Eighth Schedule; and 
 Paragraph 20 of the Eighth Schedule. 
 
Thereafter, the chapter will determine whether, the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement, as depicted in Figure 1 of chapter 2, is a fee arrangement between the general 
partner and the limited partners. That is, whether, in legal substance, both the right to 
carried interest acquired by the general partner at fund commencement, and the distribution 
of carried interest received by the general partner, represent rewards made to the general 
partner by the limited partners for services rendered / to be rendered by the former to the 
latter. 
 
In order to make this determination, the chapter will discuss and critically evaluate the 
merits of arguments advanced by various commentators, industry players and tax policy 
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makers, arguing both for and against carried interest being, in legal substance, service 
related compensation of the general partner. 
 
The chapter will then discuss and examine the applicability of paragraph (c) and related 
case law principles to the taxation of both the right to, and the distribution of, carried 
interest, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement, this being a fee 
arrangement between the general partner and the limited partners. The chapter will 
conclude by considering the tax implications, both of the right to, and the distribution of, 
carried interest, where paragraph (c) is found to apply to the taxation thereof, based on the 
legal substance of a carried interest arrangement. 
 
3.2  Tax consequences of the legal form of a carried interest arrangement 
3.2.1 Overview 
 
Based on discussions with several persons active in the South African private equity 
industry as well as a review of a private equity partnership agreement, a typical carried 
interest arrangement in South Africa takes a legal form such that: 
 The right to carried interest, in legal form, is the right of the general partner to 
share disproportionately, in partnership profits made by the fund upon disposal of a 
portfolio company. 
 The distribution of carried interest, in legal form, is the disproportionate share of 
proceeds realised by the fund partnership upon disposal of a portfolio company, 
which is allocated to the general partner, as part of its fund partnership profit share, 
provided certain conditions are met.13
.  
 
 
                                                     
13
 As discussed in section 2.2.2, the disproportionate allocation of portfolio company realisation proceeds is only made 
once the original fund capital has been returned to all the fund investors and the hurdle rate of return has been achieved 
for all the fund investors. 
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Furthermore, it is understood from discussions with various private equity fund managers 
as well as tax practitioners that deal extensively with private equity transactions, that 
almost invariably, fund partnership agreements regulating the payment and allocation of 
carried interest are silent as to why the right to carried interest is awarded and why the 
distribution of carried interest is made.  More particularly, in these agreements, there is no 
link between the services required to be rendered by the general partner – as described in 
the agreement – and the right to carried interest acquired, as well as the subsequent 
distribution of carried interest received, by the general partner. 
 
The tax consequences, both in respect of the right to carried interest and the distribution of 
carried interest, which flow from the legal form of a typical carried interest arrangement in 
South Africa, are discussed in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 below. 
 
3.2.2 Tax implications of the right to carried interest based on the legal form of a 
carried interest arrangement 
 
The right to carried interest is the right to share – albeit disproportionately – in the future 
profits of the fund, which fund, as was explained in Chapter 2, is most often a partnership.  
In the private equity context, the future profits of the fund partnership are primarily the 
realisation gains that arise upon disposal of a portfolio company
14
.  According to De Koker 
and Williams (2015: para 3.31), provided it is clear that the taxpayer is not a dealer in such 
rights, an incorporeal right such as the right to share in partnership profits, is of a capital 
nature.   
 
Accordingly, if the general partner is not a dealer in carried interest rights, it is submitted, 
that the right to carried interest will then be of a capital nature, provided that the right is 
                                                     
14
 Investors in private equity funds will generally derive the following types of income: profits from the sale of portfolio  
companies, dividends and interest. Invariably, however, the main form of income derived by private equity investors 
will be the realisation gains on disposal of portfolio companies by the fund. (Horak, 2007: 3.)   
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not acquired in respect of services rendered / to be rendered in which case, it is submitted 
that the right would be of a revenue nature.  This is because receipts and accruals arising 
from services rendered are inherently revenue in nature, being the product of one’s wit and 
labour (Singleton, 2004: 1).  In this respect, it is submitted that the right to carried interest 
is not acquired because of services rendered / to be rendered by the general partner, 
because, as was noted above, in terms of the legal form of a typical carried interest 
arrangement, there is no apparent nexus in the fund partnership agreement between the 
award of the right to carried interest and any services undertaken to be rendered by the 
general partner.  
 
It follows, therefore, that the right to carried interest – based on the legal form of a carried 
interest arrangement – is of a capital nature, being the acquisition of an incorporeal right to 
share in the future partnership profits of the fund.  It is further submitted that the 
acquisition of a right of a capital nature in such circumstances does not constitute the 
disposal of an asset in terms of paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule.  It follows that there 
can then be no capital gain or capital loss as there has been no disposal of an asset in terms 
of paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule, which would trigger capital gains tax 
consequences. 
 
Moreover, it is submitted that the acquisition of the right to carried interest does not 
constitute gross income of the general partner because paragraph (c) does not apply to the 
taxation thereof. Broadly stated, paragraph (c) requires the inclusion in gross income of 
any amount received or accrued in respect of services rendered or to be rendered, even if 
such amount would otherwise be of a capital nature.  In this respect, it would appear that 
paragraph (c) does not apply to the taxation of the right to carried interest as it would seem 
that, prima facie, the right to carried interest is not awarded to the general partner in respect 
of services to be rendered by the general partner to the limited partners for the reasons 
discussed in the paragraphs above.  
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Consequently, it is submitted that, based on the legal form of the right to carried interest, 
there will be no tax consequences upon the awarding of the right to carried interest to the 
general partner as: 
 the acquisition of the right does not constitute gross income, being an amount 
received or accrued that is of a capital nature and to which paragraph (c ) does not 
apply; and 
 the acquisition of a right of a capital nature in such circumstances is not a disposal 
of an asset for capital gains tax purposes.  
 
3.2.3  Tax implications of the distribution of carried interest based on the legal form 
of a carried interest arrangement 
 
Private equity funds in South Africa typically have a life of 10 years, and investments 
within these funds tend to be held for 5 to 8 years before being disposed of (Financial Mail, 
2014: 50). In terms of section 9C(2), any amount received or accrued (other than a 
dividend or a foreign dividend) in respect of the disposal of an equity share,
15
 must be 
deemed to be of a capital nature if that equity share had, at the time of the receipt or 
accrual of that amount, been held for a period of at least three years
16
.  
 
It therefore follows that the proceeds received on disposal of a portfolio company 
shareholding by a fund partnership, will almost invariably be qualifying shares; being 
equity shares held by the fund partnership for a continuous period of at least three years 
prior to disposal. Consequently, section 9C(2) will deem the proceeds realised on the 
disposal of a portfolio company by a fund partnership to be of a capital nature.  
 
                                                     
15
  In terms of section 1 of the Act, an equity share is defined as any share in a company, excluding any share that, neither   
as respects dividends, nor as respects returns of capital, carries any right to participate beyond a specified amount in a 
distribution. 
16
 Shares, that meet the requirements of section 9C(2), will hereafter be referred to as ‘qualifying shares’ even through 
the Act no longer uses the term qualifying share. 
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In this regard, although the fund partnership disposes of the shares in the portfolio 
company, the Act does not recognise a partnership as a distinct taxable entity.  It is 
rendered fiscally transparent and has no existence as a taxable entity apart from the 
individual partners who comprise the partnership. For capital gains tax purposes, it is 
expressly provided that the proceeds from the disposal of a partner’s interest in an asset of 
the partnership, are deemed to have accrued to that partner at the time of the disposal, in 
terms of paragraph 36 of the Eighth Schedule (De Koker and Williams, 2015: para 24.51.).  
Further, where a partnership asset has been disposed of to a third party, (as is the case here 
with the disposal of the shares in the portfolio company to an external party), the proceeds 
must be allocated among the partners according to the partnership agreement (Stiglingh, 
Koekemoer, Van Zyl, Wilcocks, De Swart, 2015: 949).   
 
In the light of what was discussed in the previous paragraph, it is submitted that the general 
partner holds an interest in the shares in the portfolio company through the fund 
partnership, rather than in its own name.  Because the fund partnership is fiscally 
transparent, however, it is further submitted that these shares must be treated for the 
purposes of section 9C(2) as if held by the general partner itself.  Consequently, it is 
submitted that section 9C(2) will apply in deeming the portfolio company realisation 
proceeds, allocated to the general partner, to be of a capital nature. This is because such 
proceeds are received by the general partner in respect of the disposal of its interest in the 
qualifying shares in the portfolio company, held by the fiscally transparent fund 
partnership
17
.  It is important to note, that the aforementioned portfolio company 
realisation proceeds, received by the general partner, include the distribution of carried 
interest, which, in legal form, as discussed above, represents a partnership profit share, 
and therefore simply forms part of the general partner’s share of the proceeds realised by 
the fund partnership upon disposal of a portfolio company. 
 
Thus, based on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement, the distribution of carried 
interest, along with the other portfolio company realisation proceeds received by the 
general partner, will be deemed to be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2).  As 
                                                     
17
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the general partner’s interest in the qualifying portfolio company shares’ 
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noted in section 3.2.1 above, in legal form, there is typically no link in the partnership 
agreement between the distribution of carried interest and the services performed by the 
general partner.  Consequently, based on the legal form of the distribution of carried 
interest, it is submitted that paragraph (c) does not apply to the taxation of the distribution 
of carried interest.  Thus, it is submitted, that the treatment of the distribution of carried 
interest on capital account, in terms of section 9C(2), will not be superseded by the 
requirement to include the distribution in gross income of the general partner, in terms of 
paragraph (c ).  
 
For the purposes of paragraph 20 of the Eighth Schedule
18, the base cost of each partner’s 
interest in a partnership asset disposed of, will comprise the amount paid for that interest 
(De Koker and Williams, 2015: para 24.51).  Accordingly, it is submitted that the base cost 
of the general partner’s interest in the qualifying portfolio company shares will, in terms of 
paragraph 20, be the capital contributed by the general partner to the fund partnership, 
which capital was utilised to acquire the general partner’s interest in these qualifying 
shares in the portfolio company. 
 
In the result, it is submitted, that the general partner will be subject to capital gains tax at 
the effective tax rate of 18,67%
19
 for a company
20
, on a capital gain determined by 
deducting from the above-mentioned portfolio company realisation proceeds received by 
the general partner - which proceeds include the distribution of carried interest - the base 
cost, determined in accordance with paragraph 20, of the general partner’s interest in the 
qualifying portfolio company shares.  Thus, the distribution of carried interest is subject to 
capital gains tax at the effective tax rate of 18,67%. 
                                                     
18
 Hereafter referred to as ‘paragraph 20’ 
19
 Calculated as follows: 100 x 66,6% CGT inclusion rate [Paragraph 10 of the Eighth Schedule] x 28% company tax 
rate.  It is noted that a new CGT inclusion rate of 80% has been proposed for companies, because of the proposed 
amendment to  paragraph 10 of the Eighth Schedule (‘paragraph 10’), as per the Draft Rates and Monetary Amounts and 
Amendment of Revenue Laws Bill of  2016 (at page 8).  As this Bill is draft legislation that has not yet been promulgated 
into law at the time of writing, the aforementioned 66,6% CGT inclusion rate for companies as per paragraph 10 has been 
used in this report as opposed to the 80% proposed inclusion rate as per the proposed revised paragraph 10. 
20
 The company tax rate is used, given that for the purposes of this report, the tax consequences of the right to carried 
interest and the distribution of carried interest are discussed and analysed with reference to the structure – as depicted in 
Figure 1 of Chapter 2 – where the general partner is a company. 
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The abovementioned tax implications are shown in the following illustrative example: 
Illustrative example 2:  Tax implications of the distribution of carried interest based 
on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement 
 
Assume that the facts are the same as the illustrative example in section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2.  
In this regard, it will be recalled that portfolio company A was acquired by the fund in year 
one, for R100 and was subsequently disposed of by the fund in year 5 for R300.  In year 5, 
the general partner was allocated, and received, R29 of the R300 realisation proceeds that 
arose upon disposal of portfolio Company A by the fund.  Furthermore, the general partner 
had contributed R2 as its co-investment to the fund, which amount was used to acquire a 
2% shareholding in portfolio company A (that is, the general partner, has an interest (equal 
to 2%) which cost R2, in the shareholding of the fund partnership, in portfolio company 
A).  The first two columns of Table 1 in section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, showing the allocation 
and distribution of the realisation proceeds to the general partner, are reproduced below: 
TABLE 2 – ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REALISATION PROCEEDS TO THE 
GENERAL PARTNER 
Allocation and distribution type General partner 
Return of capital contributions (base cost 
of shareholding) 
 R2 
 
Hurdle return  R2 
Residual realisation proceeds allocated  R25 
Total realisation proceeds allocated  R29 (R2+ R2 +R25) 
Allocation of residual realisation 
proceeds in proportion to capital 
contribution of general partner 
 R2,50   
Distribution of carried interest  R22,5 (R25- R2,5) 
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In year 5, when portfolio company A is disposed of by the fund and R29 of the total 
realisation proceeds of R300 is distributed to the general partner: 
 The full R29 realisation proceeds received by the general partner, which include 
the distribution of carried interest of R22,5 (refer Table 2 above) will, in terms of 
section 9C(2), be deemed to be of a capital nature.  This is because these 
realisation proceeds are an amount received by the general partner in respect of its 
interest in the qualifying shares in portfolio company A, held by the tax transparent  
fund partnership.  That is, the general partner, will have disposed of an interest in 
an equity shareholding in portfolio company A, which immediately prior to its 
disposal, the general partner will have owned, through the tax transparent fund 
partnership, for at least  three continuous years (in this scenario five continuous 
years, from fund commencement date, to disposal date). 
 The base cost of the general partner’s interest in the qualifying shares in portfolio 
company A will, in terms of paragraph 20, be the R2 that the general partner 
contributed to the fund partnership, which was used to acquire its interest in the 
qualifying shares in portfolio company A (refer Table 2 above). 
 The capital gain of the general partner in year 5 will be R27 (R29 proceeds – R2 
base cost) which will be subject to capital gains tax of R5 (Rounded) (R27 x 
18,67% effective tax rate) in year 5.  Notably, the distribution of carried interest, 
which, as discussed previously, forms part of the portfolio company realisation 
proceeds received by the general partner, will be included in the amount deemed to 
be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2), and will therefore also be included 
in the amount taxed at the effective tax rate of 18,67%. 
   
The tax implications discussed above follow from the assumption that that the legal form 
of a carried interest arrangement is matched by the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement. In section 3.3 below, it will be determined whether the legal substance of a 
carried interest arrangement is more appropriately characterised as a service arrangement.  
That is, whether, in legal substance, the right to carried interest acquired, and the 
distribution of carried interest received, by the general partner, constitute remuneration for 
services rendered / to be rendered by the general partner to the limited partners. 
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3.3 Determining the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
3.3.1  Overview   
According to Clegg and Stretch (2015: para 26.6.3), when there is genuine uncertainty or 
disagreement as to the nature of a transaction, the legal substance (that is, the legal reality) 
of the transaction and / or the agreement regulating the transaction must be examined.  In 
this regard, it is submitted that the legal form of a carried interest arrangement casts doubt 
and results in uncertainty, as to whether the right to carried interest acquired by the general 
partner, and the distribution of carried interest received by the general partner, truly 
represent, respectively, a right to, and a subsequent allocation of, profit of the fund 
partnership resulting from the disposal of its shares in a portfolio company, to the general 
partner.  
 
It is submitted that this is because in legal form, the general partner contributes a nominal 
amount of capital to the fund partnership, yet acquires the right to a significantly 
disproportionate share in, and is later allocated, a significantly disproportionate share of, 
fund partnership profits, arising on the disposal by the fund, of a portfolio company.  
Moreover, as already discussed, the fund partnership agreement is ordinarily silent as to 
why the right to carried interest is granted and the distribution of carried interest is made, 
while at the same time requiring the general partner to perform a number of services in 
managing the fund, for which it receives no remuneration. 
 
Consequently, it is submitted, that the legal form of a carried interest arrangement appears 
to differ from its legal substance.  In this regard, it is submitted, that, prima facie, the legal 
substance of a carried interest arrangement appears to be a fee arrangement in which the 
general partner is remunerated for services rendered / to be rendered to the limited partners 
by acquiring the right to carried interest and receiving the distribution of carried interest.  
Thus, it needs to be determined whether, and to what extent, the legal substance of a 
carried interest arrangement is indeed a service arrangement between the general partner 
and the limited partners.  This determination is made in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 below, by 
presenting and analysing arguments, advanced by various commentators, tax policy makers 
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and industry players, both for and against carried interest, being, in legal substance, service 
related compensation. 
 
3.3.2  Analysis of arguments that support carried interest as being, in legal 
substance, service related compensation 
 
Arguments put forward 
 
According to Dauds (2007: 11) the general partner does not receive the carried interest in 
return for any corresponding capital contribution; instead, the carried interest is based 
solely on the general partner’s performance.  Dauds (2007: 11) further submits that, as the 
limited partners grant the general partner the right to and thereafter transfer to the general 
partner, such a significant portion of the fund’s realisation profits as carried interest, the 
motive for forgoing such a large and disproportionate share of fund profits must surely be 
as a reward for the latter’s performance, that is, for services rendered and to be rendered.  
Put differently, why else, it is submitted, would the limited partners, who are dealing with 
the general partner at arm’s length, in a commercial transaction, forgo such a material 
share of fund realisation profits that they are otherwise entitled to, based on their 
significant capital contributions, if not to remunerate the general partner for services 
rendered or to be rendered. 
 
In this regard, the limited partners waive a portion of their profits to incentivise the general 
partner to work actively to create value in the private equity fund (Bergkvist, Nilsson, 
Hagbard Beyer, 2014: 143).  It follows that the carried interest actually represents 
compensation for services rendered by the general partner, more particularly performance 
fees earned (Dauds, 2007: 11 and Horak, 2007: 5). 
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Aron-Dine (2007: 5) asserts that the general partner does not put enough of its own 
financial capital at risk and that the basic standard for establishing whether the carried 
interest represents a capital gain would seem to be whether the general partner has a 
material amount of financial capital at stake.  In this regard, Aron-Dine (2007: 5) quotes 
Bloomberg News columnist John Berry who states that: 
‘The general partner obtains the 20% carried interest in return for management services, not 
because [it] contributes 20% of the capital in the pot [the private equity fund].’  
 
Aron-Dine (2007: 6) further argues that the general partner is performing a service, for 
which the carried interest is clearly compensating it.  This is because, unlike the fund’s 
limited partners, the general partner is responsible for making investment decisions and for 
managing investments. The general partner often appoints its key executives to the boards 
of the portfolio companies and is frequently involved in the day to day decisions of these 
companies, not unlike corporate Chief Executive Officers. (Aron-Dine, 2007: 6.)  
 
In addition, Aron-Dine (2007: 6) contends that the general partner in essence provides long 
term consulting services to the limited partners, quoting, in support of this view, the 
following statement made by a United States private equity representative at the Senate 
Finance Committee hearing on carried interest:  
‘What we do, Senator, is to help build a company… we take a technologist, as an example, who 
knows a lot about how to build a chip but has never hired a salesperson, a marketing person – 
never even put together a HR person – and we will advise them on how to take that technology 
idea.. be a catalyst to help pull that technology through the process to ultimately get it 
commercialised.’ 
 
Moreover, the Blackstone Group
21
, in a filing with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, is quoted as follows: 
                                                     
21 The Blackstone Group is a global leader in private equity, with $94 billion in assets under management. 
[http://www.blackstone.com/the-firm/asset-management/private-equity] (accessed 7 January 2016.) 
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‘We also believe that the primary source of income from each of our [private equity] businesses is 
properly characterised as income earned in exchange for the provision of services.’ (Aron-Dine, 
2007: 6.) 
 
In addition, it is submitted, that strong support for the argument that carried interest is 
service related compensation which is performance based is to be found in the glossary to 
the KPMG and  SAVCA Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry Performance Survey 
of South Africa covering the 2014 calendar year, where it is stated: 
 ‘[That carried interest] represents a fee enhancement for a private equity fund manager for 
achieving a benchmark return or hurdle rate.’ (Emphasis Added) 
 
Analysis of the arguments  
 
It is submitted that the arguments presented above support the view that the legal substance 
of a carried interest arrangement is that of a service arrangement between the general 
partner and the limited partners.  More precisely, it is further submitted that in legal 
substance, it appears that the limited partners reward the general partner for various fund 
management services rendered / to be rendered by the general partner to them by first 
granting the general partner the right to carried interest and thereafter paying the general 
partner a performance based fee, which is the distribution of carried interest.  
 
3.3.3  Analysis of arguments that support carried interest as being other than service 
related compensation of the general partner  
 
Argument 1 
The enhanced return obtained by the general partner as the distribution of carried interest is 
commensurate with the greater risk the general partner is exposed to compared to the 
limited partners who invest in the private equity fund, given that receipt of the distribution 
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of carried interest is subordinate to all other investment proceeds received by the fund 
investors (that is, the distribution of carried interest is received only after repayment of the 
cost of the fund investments initially made and the payment of the hurdle return to all the 
fund investors). Further, the distribution of carried interest is only received when the fund 
investments perform well.  In light of this different risk profile, there is a need for a 
differential return between the limited partners and the general partner.  This is delivered 
through the requirement of the general partner to invest typically 1% - 2% of the capital of 
the fund, whilst sharing 20% of the fund’s top slice profits. (British Venture Capital 
Association, 2007: 6 and Fournier and O’Hara, 2006: 24.).  The concept of differential 
returns is not unique to private equity funds and is a conventional way of reflecting the 
economic circumstances of different types of investor acting together in a shared 
investment (British Venture Capital Association, 2007: 6). 
  
Analysis of argument 1 
It is submitted that this argument does not hold up to scrutiny.  This is so, it is submitted, 
because although the general partner may be exposed to the risk of not receiving a 
distribution of carried interest given the requirements first to return initial investment 
capital and then to pay the hurdle return, this in no way impacts on the risk of it losing its 
1% - 2% capital co-invested in the fund.  
 
As was discussed in chapter 2, before the distribution of carried interest is made, the initial 
capital of all the fund investors, including the general partner is repaid.  Moreover, the 
general partner, along with the limited partners, also receives the hurdle return on its 
investment.  On this basis, it is submitted that the investment risk and the economic 
characteristics of the general partner’s 1% - 2% capital contributed to the fund22 are the 
same as that of the 98% - 99% capital contributed to the fund by the limited partners
23
.  
Consequently, it is further submitted, that the right to a disproportionate return on the co-
investment of the general partner, namely the right to carried interest, and the 
                                                     
22
 Hereafter  referred to as the ‘co-investment of the general partner’ 
23
 Hereafter  referred to as the ‘investment of the limited partners’ 
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disproportionate return on the co-investment, namely the distribution of carried interest, 
must be for services rendered / to be rendered by the general partner to the limited partners, 
rather than being attributable to the greater investment risk attached to the general partner’s 
co-investment when compared to the investment of the limited partners. 
 
In this regard, Aron-Dine (2007: 8) argues that while the requirement first to repay the 
initial capital contributed as well as to achieve the hurdle return makes the distribution of 
the carried interest subject to performance conditions, which conditions make the receipt of 
the distribution more risky, risky compensation is still compensation for services rendered.  
Differently put, characterisation of the distribution of carried interest as service based 
compensation should not be affected by the fact that receipt of the distribution is 
contingent upon performance conditions being met, which performance conditions make 
receipt of the distribution more risky.  A wide variety of performance based compensation 
arrangements, including arrangements in which service providers accept the entire risk of 
success or failure of an enterprise, is effectively compensation for services rendered.  
Examples include contingent fees based on movie revenues paid to actors, lawyer 
contingency fees, performance bonuses paid to employees and directors, share options, 
royalties and incentive fees paid to managers of other people’s money (Aron-Dine, 2007: 
9-10.) 
 
Argument 2 
Given that the general partner has unlimited liability to third parties for the debts of the 
fund, it could may be argued that this exposes the general partner to significantly more risk 
than that of the limited partners, for which the general partner is rewarded by being granted 
the right to and thereafter receiving the distribution of carried interest.  
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Analysis of argument 2 
It is submitted that this argument in no way supports the contention that the right to and 
distribution of carried interest is not for services rendered by the general partner to the 
limited partners.  This is because the undertaking by the general partner to accept 
additional risk (of unlimited liability) does not impact in any way on the risk of its 
underlying co-investment.  It follows then that the right to carried interest and the 
distribution of carried interest cannot be investment rewards for the greater investment 
risk to which the general partner is exposed compared to the limited partners. 
 
Consequently, it is further submitted, that both the right to and the distribution of carried 
interest are quid pro quo for the service to be rendered / rendered by the general partner to 
the limited partners, which service is the undertaking by the general partner to accept third 
party unlimited liability risk for the debts of the partnership
24
.  
 
That an undertaking by a taxpayer to accept risk on behalf of other parties is a service 
rendered by that taxpayer is further supported, it is submitted, by the case of  H v COT 
1957 (4), SA 478 (SR), 21 SATC 346 (‘H v COT’).  In H v COT, the taxpayer, a director, 
received shares in a company as consideration for an undertaking to guarantee the payment 
of the company’s debts. The issues to be decided in this case were whether the undertaking 
to give the guarantee (that is, the undertaking to take on the risk of the company defaulting 
on its debts) was a service rendered and whether the receipt of the shares was in respect of 
such a service rendered.  It was held (at 347) that the undertaking to give the guarantee was 
a personal act of service performed by the taxpayer, that is, the rendering of a service by 
the taxpayer.   It was held further (at 347) that the shares which the taxpayer had received 
for a nominal payment were a receipt in respect of such a service and therefore formed part 
of his gross income. 
 
 
                                                     
24
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the risk undertaking by the general partner’ 
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Argument 3 
The services provided to the limited partners of the fund are performed not by the general 
partner, but rather by the key executives of the private equity management company
25
, 
which company is fully remunerated for such services on an arm’s length basis by charging 
a management fee which is fully taxable.  The carried interest is divorced from and has 
entirely different economic characteristics compared to these management fees, as the 
carried interest is the investment reward pertaining to the co-investment by the general 
partner. (British Venture Capital Association, 2007: 8 and Garcia: 2008: 40-41.) 
 
Analysis of argument 3 
In response to this argument it is submitted that because the general partner is the fund 
manager – as was discussed in detail in chapter 2 – it will invariably be required to perform 
fund management services in respect of which the right to and the distribution of carried 
interest is clearly compensating it.  Consequently, it is submitted that the argument that the 
general partner performs no fund management services cannot be correct.  Moreover, as 
has already been discussed, because the co-investment of the general partner is subject to 
the same degree of risk and has the same economic characteristics as that of the investment 
of the limited partners, it is submitted that the carried interest cannot be the investment 
reward in respect of the general partner’s co-investment; rather, it is the reward for 
services rendered / to be rendered by the general partner to the limited partners. 
 
 
3.3.4 Conclusion: Determining the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
 
Based on the analysis conducted in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 above, of the arguments both 
for and against carried interest being service related compensation, it may be concluded 
                                                     
25 The private equity management company corresponds to PE ManCo in Figure 1 per section 2.2.1 of chapter 2, which 
receives a management fee of 2% of fund capital. 
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that in legal substance, a carried interest arrangement entails the general partner 
undertaking to render and thereafter rendering to the limited partners, in the capacity of 
service provider, various fund management services as well as performing the additional 
service of assuming the risk of unlimited liability in respect of third party debts of the fund.  
Furthermore, in legal substance, it is submitted that the general partner acquires the right to 
and receives the distribution of, carried interest as a reward for the aforementioned 
services rendered / to be rendered rather than as an enhanced investment reward / return 
based on the ostensibly higher risk exposures of its co-investment in the fund compared to 
the limited partners’ investments.   
 
Consequently, it is submitted that the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement does 
not accord with its legal form.  This is because in legal substance, a carried interest 
arrangement is a fee arrangement in which the general partner is remunerated for services 
rendered / to be rendered to the limited partners.  This applies even though in legal form a 
carried interest arrangement entails the acquisition of the right to, and the subsequent 
receipt by, the general partner, of a disproportionate share of fund partnership profits, in its 
capacity as partner and not as service provider to the limited partners. 
 
Accordingly, it needs to be established which taxing provision(s) and which case law 
principles will likely apply to the taxation of carried interest based on the legal substance 
of a carried interest arrangement.  As already discussed, broadly stated, paragraph (c) taxes 
amounts received or accrued attributable to services rendered, as gross income, irrespective 
of whether the amount is of a capital nature.  In this regard, as in legal substance both the 
right to and distribution of carried interest are rewards for services rendered / to be 
rendered, prima facie, this would point to paragraph (c) applying to the taxation thereof.  
Whether, and to what extent, paragraph (c) does in fact apply to the taxation of carried 
interest, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement, is examined in 
section 3.4 below. 
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3.4  Determining the application of paragraph (c) to the taxation of carried 
interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
3.4.1 Overview 
 
Section 1 of the Act contains a definition of ‘gross income’, the introductory portion of 
which, in so far as is relevant for this report, reads as follows
26
: 
‘Gross income in relation to any year or period of assessment, means – 
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or 
in favour of such resident… 
during such year of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature, but including, 
without in any way limiting the scope of this definition, such amounts (whether of a capital nature 
or not) so received or accrued as described hereunder,…’. 
 
Paragraphs (a) to (n)
27
 extend the scope of the definition of ‘gross income’ by 
including certain amounts in a taxpayer’s gross income, irrespective of whether these 
amounts may otherwise be of a capital nature. 
Of the special inclusions in gross income, as already noted, paragraph (c) is of particular 
relevance in this report.  Paragraph (c) includes in gross income 
‘any amount… received or accrued in respect of services rendered or to be rendered…’.  
Both the terms ‘services rendered’ and ‘in respect of’ in paragraph (c) are not defined in 
the Act and give rise to several questions of interpretation.  These terms have however 
received judicial interpretation and an analysis of some of these decisions follows to 
provide clarity and understanding of the meaning of these terms as used in the context of 
paragraph (c) and as a basis for assessing the application of paragraph (c) to the taxation of 
carried interest, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement. 
 
                                                     
26
 Hereafter referred to as the opening words of the definition of ‘gross income’. 
27
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the special inclusions in gross income’ 
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3.4.2    Establishing the meaning of the term ‘services rendered’ 
 
 In ITC 1692, 62 SATC 508, two cases with insightful findings in relation to the meaning of 
‘services rendered’ were cited (Singleton, 2004:  10). 
 
In the first case, Maseti v Key NO & others, 1951 (2) SA 187 (C), Herbstein J said the 
following at 192D: (Singleton, 2004: 12) 
‘The phrase for services rendered is in common use and its ordinary meaning is that something has 
been done for the benefit of some person, e.g. supplying of a particular need. When one speaks of 
a fee for services rendered one means the payment of a sum of money as compensation for an act 
which  has been performed, or a need which has been provided.’   
 
The second case cited was H v COT 1957 (4), SA 478 (SR), 21 SATC 346 where 
Young J attributed a very wide meaning to the words ‘services rendered’ when he said 
the following at 482E-G: (Singleton, 2004: 12) 
‘As to the first question, the term “services rendered” is an ordinary English one and not a 
technical expression. It should I think, therefore be given its ordinary connotation unless there is 
something in the context to justify another meaning. The expression ordinarily suggests work and 
labour done, i.e. personal acts: cf, Sowerby & Co v GN Railway, 7 TLR 392; and I find nothing in 
the context to justify a departure from that meaning; rather the contrary, because the reference in 
sec.8(b) to amounts accrued whether “payable under any contract of employment or service or 
not” supports, I think, the above conclusion,’. 
 
According to Singleton (2004: 12), the broad scope of what comprises ‘services 
rendered’ can be encapsulated in the words of Meyerowitz (Meyerowitz, 2001-2002: 
para 9.1.2.) 
‘services are not confined to employment as such, but include any form of service, e.g. 
professional services such as medical, legal, architectural, or as a director and so on, and casual 
services. e.g. passing on some information’. 
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As stated in chapter 1 as well as chapter 2, at inception of the fund, the general partner 
undertakes to provide and thereafter typically renders a range of services, namely the 
identification, evaluation and negotiation of investment opportunities and the monitoring 
and realisation of those investments for the private equity fund, and by extension for the 
limited partners.  Thus, it is submitted, that the fund management services rendered or to 
be rendered by the general partner to the limited partners, would constitute services 
rendered or to be rendered for the purposes of paragraph (c).  Moreover, as already 
discussed in section 3.3.3, on the authority of H v COT, it is further submitted that the 
undertaking by the general partner to accept third party unlimited liability risk for the debts 
of the partnership, is a service rendered / to be rendered as contemplated by paragraph (c). 
 
3.4.3  Establishing the meaning of the term ‘in respect of’ 
 
It is submitted that the critical enquiry is whether the amount accrued to and thereafter 
received by the general partner, namely the right to carried interest and the distribution of 
carried interest respectively, is ‘in respect of’ services rendered or to be rendered by the 
general partner to the fund’s limited partners, in the context of paragraph (c). 
 
The meaning of the term ‘in respect of’ in the context of paragraph (c) was considered in 
Stander v CIR 1997 (3) SA 617 (C), 59 SATC 21, where it was given a narrow 
interpretation.  In this respect, the court held (at 219), that for an amount to be derived ‘in 
respect of services rendered’, there must be a direct causal link between the amount 
received and the services rendered. 
Further, in De Villiers v CIR 1929 AD 227, 4 SATC 86, (at 87) Stratford JA stated that: 
‘[t]he words “in respect of” had received judicial interpretation in the case of Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Crown Mines Ltd (1923 AD 121) in which Innes CJ said that a tax could not be 
imposed “in respect of” a particular subject –matter unless it “had direct relationship to that 
matter’’, by which was meant, his Lordship thought, “causal relationship.’’ ’ 
 38 
 
 
It is submitted, that the application of the test of causation as applied in the Appellate 
Division case of Tuck v CIR 1988 (3) SA 819 (A), 50 SATC 98 (‘the Tuck case’), where 
the determination of the capital or revenue nature of a single amount received was 
considered, is most appropriate for purposes of determining whether, and to what extent, 
the right to and the distribution of carried interest are ‘in respect of’ services rendered / to 
be rendered.  In this regard, the judgment in the Tuck case is discussed and analysed and 
the application of its principles of causation and apportionment to the taxation of carried 
interest is considered below. 
 
Tuck v CIR 
The Judgment of the Appellate Division 
In the Tuck case, Corbett JA, for the purpose of characterising a receipt or accrual as being 
of a capital or income nature for tax purposes, formulated the test to be applied as follows: 
(at 113) 
‘In a case such as the present, however, it seems to me that most problems of characterisation could 
appropriately be dealt with by applying the simple test as indicated by Watermeyer CJ in the passage 
quoted from his judgment in the Lever Bros case viz by asking what work if any, did the taxpayer do 
in order to earn the receipt in question, what was the quid pro quo which he gave for the receipt?’ 
 
In this respect, Corbett JA concluded (at 114) that there were two main elements giving 
rise to the receipt of the shares: the services rendered to the company and the element of 
restraint and that neither of these could be regarded as the sole quid pro quo given by the 
appellant. 
 
Corbett JA, citing both South African and foreign cases which expressed support for the 
notion of apportionment, and noting that there was no authority in South African case law 
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for the apportionment of a receipt which contained an income element as well as an 
element of a capital nature, made the following pronouncement (at 114 and 115): 
‘It seems to me that in a proper case apportionment provides a sensible and practical solution to 
the problem which arises when a taxpayer receives a single receipt and the quid pro quo contains 
two or more separate elements, one or more of which would characterise it as capital. It could 
hardly have been the intention of the legislature that in such circumstances the receipt be regarded 
wholly as an income receipt, to the disadvantage of the taxpayer, or wholly as a capital receipt to 
the detriment of the fiscus.’ 
 
Corbett JA proceeded to make the following apportionment (at 115): 
‘It is not possible to infer that one element is more important than the other and in all 
circumstances I consider that a 50/50 apportionment would be fair and reasonable.’ 
 
Corbett JA held (at 116) that only 50% of the receipt in respect of the holding company 
shares – that represented the quid pro quo for services rendered by the taxpayer – 
constituted taxable income. 
 
Analysis of the judgment 
In the Tuck case, the Appellate Division expressly approved the use of the originating 
cause, or quid pro quo test for the purpose of characterising the receipt of the shares as 
being of a capital or revenue nature (Emslie and Jooste, 1989: 295).  In this regard, Emslie 
and Jooste (1989: 299) assert that in determining the causa for the purposes of ascertaining 
the capital or revenue nature of an amount received or accrued, one must enquire what is 
the originating cause, or quid pro quo, giving rise to it.  
 
It is therefore submitted that when the quid pro quo for any single receipt or accrual 
contains two or more separate elements, one or more of which would characterise it as 
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capital, an apportionment on a fair and reasonable basis is always required (the Tuck case 
at 114 and 115 and Emslie and Jooste, 1989: 304). 
 
Application of the Tuck Case to the taxation of carried interest 
Causation 
As discussed above, the test of causation in the Tuck case enquires what work, if any, did 
the taxpayer do in order to earn the receipt or accrual; what was the quid pro quo that the 
taxpayer gave for the receipt or accrual.  Applied in the context of carried interest, it is 
submitted that the work done, being the various fund management services undertaken to 
be rendered and thereafter rendered – as discussed in section 2.2.2 above – by the general 
partner to the limited partners, as well as the risk undertaking of the general partner, 
discussed in section 3.3.3 above, is clearly the quid pro quo for the right to carried interest 
and, thereafter, for the distribution of carried interest.  
 
That this is the case is supported by the conclusion in section 3.3.4 above that in legal 
substance, the general partner acquires the right to carried interest and receives the 
distribution of carried interest as a reward for, that is, as quid pro quo, for the services 
rendered / to be rendered to the limited partners.  It may therefore be concluded that there 
is a direct causal link between the services rendered or to be rendered by the general 
partner to the limited partners and the right to carried interest awarded as well as the 
distribution of carried interest. Consequently, it is submitted that the right to carried 
interest is an amount acquired by the general partner, and the distribution of carried interest 
is an amount received by the general partner in respect of services rendered or to be 
rendered, as envisaged in paragraph (c), by the general partner to the limited partners. 
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Apportionment 
It is submitted, on the authority of the Tuck case, that if it were evident that the quid pro 
quo for the award of the right to carried interest and the distribution of carried interest 
consisted of two or more separate elements, one or more of which would characterise it as 
capital, then apportionment between its revenue and capital components, on an equitable 
and reasonable basis, would be required.  
 
In section 3.3.4 above, however, after having examined arguments both for and against 
carried interest being, in legal substance, service related compensation, it was concluded 
that it was only services rendered / to be rendered that was the quid pro quo, both for the 
right to and the distribution of carried interest.  As already discussed in section 3.2.2, 
according to Singleton (2004: 1) receipts and accruals from services rendered are 
inherently of a revenue nature, being the product of one’s wit and labour.  Consequently, 
the quid pro quo both for the right to and the distribution of carried interest comprise only 
one element, namely services rendered / to be rendered, which is of a revenue nature.  It 
follows then that no apportionment is required as there is no capital element included in the 
quid pro quo for either the right to or the distribution of carried interest. 
 
3.4.4  Determining the application of paragraph (c) to the taxation of the right to 
carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
 
In section 3.4.3 above, it was established that in legal substance the right to carried interest 
is acquired by the general partner ‘in respect of’ services to be rendered as contemplated 
by paragraph (c), by the general partner to the limited partners.  It must be stressed, 
however, that in order for paragraph (c) to apply at all to the taxation of the right to carried 
interest, certain additional criteria in paragraph (c) also need to be met, namely, that that 
there must be an ‘amount’ which ‘accrues’ to the taxpayer in respect of the services to be 
rendered. 
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Consequently, in order to establish if paragraph (c) applies to the taxation of the right to 
carried interest, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement, it needs to 
be determined if this right constitutes an ‘amount’ that has ‘accrued’ to the general partner 
at the inception of the fund.  This is considered below. 
 
 
 
Meaning of an ‘amount’ 
 
Singleton (2004: 4) explains that the word ‘amount’ also appears in the opening words of 
the definition of ‘gross income’ when it refers to amounts received or accrued, whether in 
cash or otherwise.  In this respect, Singleton (2004: 5) submits that because of the 
relationship between paragraph (c) and the opening words of the definition of ‘gross 
income’, the amount received or accrued under paragraph (c) is an ‘amount in cash or 
otherwise’ as used in the opening words of the gross income definition. 
 
In this regard, the courts have held that an ‘amount’ includes not only money, but also the 
value of every form of property earned by the taxpayer, whether corporeal or incorporeal, 
which has a monetary value (Lategan v CIR 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16 at 19, (‘the 
Lategan case’) and CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty Ltd) 1990 (2) SA 353 (A),  52  
SATC 9 at 21 (‘the People’s Stores case’). 
 
In the context of fiscal legislation, property has been described as meaning rights which 
have a monetary value in the hands of the holder.  Such rights include real rights and 
personal rights. (Singleton, 2004: 5.).  A real right (jus in rem) is a right in a thing, which is 
enforceable against all persons, or differently put, against the whole world, for example, 
ownership in both movable and immovable property.  A personal right (jus in personam) is 
a right against a particular person or group of persons, for example, rights of action to 
claim delivery of a thing or to claim performance of an act. (Singleton, 2004: 5 and 
McAllister, 2015: 43-44.) 
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The general principle is that, should a non-cash amount accrue to or be received by a 
taxpayer, then the market value of such property, as valued on the date of receipt or 
accrual, should be included in the taxpayer’s gross income (Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v 
CIR 1938 AD 267, 9 SATC 349 at 362).   
 
This property, whether corporeal or incorporeal, must however, have an ascertainable 
money value.  In addition, the onus of establishing that an ‘amount’ has been received or 
accrued rests upon the Commissioner. (Stiglingh et al, 2015: 16.)  
 
The leading authority that if a receipt or accrual has no ascertainable monetary value, then 
it cannot fall into gross income, is CIR v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd 1945 AD 301, 13 SATC 
21 (‘the Butcher Bothers case’).  This case concerned the owner of a building who, at the 
end of a lease, of considerable duration, would obtain the benefit of certain improvements 
effected by the lessee to the lease premises.  The question was whether an ‘amount’ had 
accrued to the lessor in the current tax year, and if so, what its value was.  It was held that 
the lessor would not get the benefit of the improvements until the expiry of the lease 30 
years into the future and that it was therefore impossible for purposes of the current tax 
year to estimate the value of that benefit.  The value of the benefit was so conjectural, 
given the duration of the lease and the uncertainty as to the value of the improvements at 
the expiry of the lease, that it had no ascertainable money value in the present tax year.  
Consequently, no ‘amount’ had accrued to the taxpayer in that tax year in respect of those 
improvements. (Clegg and Stretch, 2015: para 4.10 and Williams, 2009: 82 - 83.) 
 
In summary, for an ‘amount’ to be included in paragraph (c), it must be an amount in cash, 
or if it is a non-cash award, it must constitute ‘property’ which has an ‘ascertainable money 
value’. Furthermore, where a non-cash award qualifies as an amount received or accrued, it 
must be valued at its market value at the date of receipt or accrual. 
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Determining if the right to carried interest constitutes an ‘amount’ 
 
The right to carried interest, awarded to the general partner at the inception of the fund, is a 
non-cash award. Consequently, in order to be an ‘amount’ for the purposes of paragraph 
(c), it needs to be determined, as discussed in the paragraph immediately above, if this 
right constitutes ‘property’ and if the right has an ‘ascertainable money value’. 
 
The right to carried interest is a contractual right of the general partner to a 
disproportionate share of future fund realisation proceeds, which proceeds constitute the 
distribution of carried interest.  Accordingly, this right represents a right of action by the 
general partner to claim delivery from the limited partners of the distribution of carried 
interest.  This means that the right to carried interest is a personal right.  Thus, it is 
submitted, that this right constitutes property. 
  
It then remains to determine if this property has an ascertainable money value at the 
inception of the fund.  In this respect, the value of an asset such as the right to carried 
interest, is derived from its expected future cash flows, taking into account the risk in 
realising these expected cash flows. To this end, a discounted cash flow method or an 
option pricing method is typically used to estimate the value of the right to carried interest 
at the fund’s inception. (Fournier and O’Hara, 2006: 24.)  
 
The discounted cash flow method projects the expected future cash flows arising upon the 
distribution of the carried interest and discounts them at a rate of return commensurate 
with the risk involved in realising those cash flows.  An alternative to the discounted cash 
flow method is to value the right to carried interest using standard option pricing theory, 
that is to say, using an option pricing model.  Similar to a call option28, the right to carried 
interest represents the right to the 20% share of the disposal value of an investment (the 
portfolio company) above a predetermined level (that is, the exercise price).  In this case, 
                                                     
28
 A call option is defined as an agreement that gives the purchaser the right, but not the obligation, to buy a fixed 
quantity of a  commodity, financial instrument or some other underlying asset, at a given price at or before a specified 
date (Arnold, 2005: 638). 
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the ‘exercise price’ is the contributed capital of the private equity fund, plus the 
accumulated preferred return (that is, the hurdle return) at the termination of the fund, 
when the portfolio company is disposed of (Fournier and O’Hara 2006: 24.).  Given the 
aforementioned similarity of the right to carried interest and a call option, Fournier and 
O’Hara (2006: 24) advise that option pricing models such as Black Scholes, or the 
binomial model may be used to calculate the value of the right to carried interest, which is 
a financial asset, by analysing the volatility and opportunity cost of investing in this asset.  
 
It should be noted, however, that both of the valuation methodologies (that is,  discounted 
cash flow method and the option pricing method) discussed above, rely on a number of 
estimates, assumptions and subjective judgements in determining the value of the right to carried 
interest at the fund’s inception.   Accordingly, there may well be a fairly sizeable difference 
in the value determined for the right to carried interest, at the fund’s inception, using either 
of these valuation methods and the value of the distribution of carried interest ultimately 
received by the general partner. (Fournier and O’Hara 2006: 24-25.) 
 
Based on the discussion above, it is submitted that the right to carried interest, awarded at 
the inception of the fund, has an ascertainable money value. This is because, as noted 
above, recognised valuation methodologies may be used to determine a value for this right 
at the commencement of the fund.  It is further submitted that although these valuation 
models require a degree of subjective judgement as well as the use of estimates and 
assumptions, employing either of these valuation methods, still yields a value for the right 
to carried interest.  Thus, it is submitted, that the monetary value of the right to carried 
interest at the fund’s inception is ascertainable.  This position may be contrasted with the 
Butcher Bothers case, cited above, where, given the significant magnitude of the 
uncertainties that existed in attempting to value leasehold improvements, 30 years 
subsequent to the year of assessment, it was held by the court (at 42) that it appeared 
impossible that any trustworthy estimate for the value of such improvements could ever 
be obtained.  
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In conclusion, as argued above, because the right to carried interest constitutes ‘property’ 
and because it has an ‘ascertainable money value’, it is submitted that this right is an 
‘amount’ within the meaning of paragraph (c) of the definition of ‘gross income’. 
 
 
Meaning of ‘accrued to’ 
 
After years of debate as to the meaning of the term ‘accrued to’, the matter was finally 
settled in the People’s Stores case, where the court (at 22) upheld the judgment in the 
Lategan case that the meaning of the words ‘accrued to’, was ‘entitled to’.  In the Lategan 
case, the court was called upon to decide the date of accrual of the proceeds from the sale 
of wine by a farmer in a particular year of assessment.  Part of the price was received in 
that year, while the balance was payable in instalments after the end of that year.  The 
taxpayer argued that the debt receivable in the future had not accrued to him, but the court 
held that he became entitled to a right to claim future receipts on the date of the sale and 
therefore had to include the total value of the sale in his gross income in the year during 
which the sale took place. (Haupt, 2012: 23 and Stiglingh et al, 2015: 20.)  
 
According to Stiglingh et al (2015: 20-21) the meaning of the term ‘accrued to’ therefore 
implies that the taxpayer must be entitled to an amount.  The physical receipt thereof in the 
year of assessment, as well as the enforceability thereof, is irrelevant for the purposes of 
the concept of an accrual.  For instance, in the case where goods are sold on credit in year 
one, but are only due and payable in year two, the seller has already obtained a vested right 
in year one, namely a right to future payment – he has a right in year one to claim payment 
in year two.  This right to future payment will result in an inclusion in gross income in year 
one, provided that the right has a monetary value. (Stiglingh et al, 2015: 21.) 
 
Stiglingh et al (2015: 21.) explain that there is, however, an important qualification, 
namely that the taxpayer must be unconditionally entitled to the amount.  According to 
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Stiglingh et al (2015: 21) this principle has, inter alia, been confirmed in Ochberg v CIR 
1933 CPD 256, 6 SATC 1 (at 264) and in Mooi v CIR 1972 (1) SA 675 (A), 34 SATC 1 (at 
684).  If the right of the taxpayer to claim future payments is conditional, for example, 
subject to the approval of a third party, there can be no accrual.  Accrual can take place 
only after the conditions have been fulfilled, as the taxpayer is not entitled to the amount 
until this has taken place. (Stiglingh et al, 2015: 21.) 
 
Determining if the right to carried interest accrues to the general partner 
 
It will be recalled from chapter 2 that the distribution of carried interest will only be 
received by the general partner provided that: 
 first, all the capital contributions made have been returned to all the private equity 
fund investors, being both the general and limited partners; and 
 second, the hurdle rate of return on investment has been achieved for all the fund 
investors, being both the general and limited partners. 
 
It is therefore clear from the above bullet points that various conditions need to be met 
before the general partner receives its distribution of carried interest.  Consequently, it is 
submitted, that the right to carried interest, acquired by the general partner, is a contingent 
right, which does not give the general partner an unconditional entitlement, at fund 
inception, to claim payment of the distribution of carried interest in a future year.   For 
these reasons, it is further submitted, that the right to carried interest does not accrue to the 
general partner at fund inception; rather it accrues when the general partner becomes 
unconditionally entitled to claim payment of the carried interest, which occurs once all the 
carried interest conditions have been satisfied.  Consequently, it is submitted, that the 
accrual of the right to carried interest occurs contemporaneously with the receipt by the 
general partner of the distribution of carried interest. 
 
That the right to carried interest is a contingent right, which accrues to the general partner, 
not at fund inception, but rather once all the carried interest conditions have been satisfied, 
 48 
 
is supported, it is submitted, by the Appellate Division case of Mooi v CIR, 1972 (1) SA 
675 (A), 34 SATC 1 (‘the Mooi case’) which is discussed below. 
 
Mooi v CIR 
Factual Background 
The taxpayer, an employee of the Phalaborwa Mining Co Ltd accepted his employer’s 
offer, on 27 July 1963, of an option to subscribe, at R1,25 per share, for 500 of the 
company’s R1 shares, subject to various conditions, inter alia: (a) the option was not 
exercisable until six months after completion of the company’s mine at Phalaborwa: (b) the 
option could be exercised only if the taxpayer was still employed by the company.  It was 
common cause that the option was in respect of services rendered and to induce him to 
render future services to the company.  In October 1966, the taxpayer exercised the option 
and acquired 500 shares for R1,25 each.  Their market value at that time was R6,40 each.  
The total market value of the shares acquired by the taxpayer therefore exceeded the option 
price paid by him by R2 575. (Williams, 2009: 105.) 
 
The Commissioner included the sum of R2 575 in the taxpayer’s gross income for the tax 
year ended 28 February 1967, as an amount which had accrued to him in respect of 
services rendered or to be rendered when the option became exercisable, that is, 1 
September 1966 (Williams, 2009: 105). 
 
The taxpayer objected on the basis that what had accrued to him in respect of services 
rendered or to be rendered was the right he acquired on 27 July 1963 (when he accepted 
his employer’s offer to grant him the option) to exercise an option at a later date when 
certain conditions had been fulfilled.  More particularly, the taxpayer asserted that the right 
had accrued on 27 July 1963 as that was the date that there came into existence an 
enforceable contract of option between the taxpayer and his employer, that is, from this 
date the taxpayer was able to take legal action, in terms of the contract of option, against 
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his employer to protect his rights in terms of the option granted.  Furthermore, the taxpayer 
argued that the option accrued on this date as it was capable of being valued in money on 
this date. (The Mooi case at 650 and Williams, 2009: 105.) 
 
The Judgment of the Appellate Division 
In deciding precisely what it was that accrued to the taxpayer, and when such accrual took 
place, Ogilvie Thompson CJ held the following (at 684D-F): 
‘In the present case, as already emphasised, services still needed to be rendered by appellant after 
July 1963, and there can be no doubt that the true and real benefit contemplated by the letter of 25 
July 1963 was the right, upon due fulfilment of all the conditions stated in that letter, to obtain 
shares at the price of R1.25 per share … In my view, the contingent right which appellant acquired 
on 23 July 1963, did no more than – to borrow a phrase used by Sellers LJ  in the court of appeal in 
Abbot’s case and subsequently adopted by Lord Keith in the House of Lords – “set up the machinery 
for creating a benefit’’, which said benefit only accrued when the option became exercisable. 
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that no accrual within the meaning of the definition of “gross 
income” occurred in July 1963 (cf Ochberg v CIR and Hersov’s case, but that the relevant accrual 
occurred when the option became exercisable on 1 September 1966.  The real benefit conferred 
upon appellant, which was at all material times in the contemplation of all concerned, was the right 
to apply for the shares at R1,25 per share and that right arose when upon fulfilment of the conditions 
of the option, the latter became exercisable.’  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Application of the Mooi Case in determining the time of accrual of the right to carried 
interest 
Based on the judgment in the Mooi case, Williams (2009: 122) asserts that a right is 
conditional / contingent, when its enforceability is suspended until the occurrence of an 
uncertain future event.  Furthermore, on the authority of the Mooi case, where a taxpayer 
acquires a contingent right, such a right does no more than ‘set up the machinery for 
creating a benefit’ and the benefit accrues on the date when all the conditions attaching to 
the right are fulfilled.  This is the case even if such a contingent right possesses a money 
value at the time of its acquisition and notwithstanding that such a right is enforceable 
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insofar as the taxpayer is able to take legal action to protect it. (De Koker and Williams, 
2015: para 2.11 and Williams, 2009: 122.) 
 
Applying the judgment in the Mooi case to determine the time of accrual of the right to 
carried interest, it is submitted that this right, acquired by the general partner at the fund’s 
inception, is contingent.  This is because its enforceability, to claim payment of the carried 
interest, is suspended, until the fulfilment of the carried interest conditions.  It follows then 
that the right to carried interest, acquired at fund commencement, does no more than ‘set 
up the machinery for creating a benefit’ and that the benefit accrues on the date when all 
the carried interest conditions are fulfilled.  This is despite the fact that the right to carried 
interest is capable of being valued – as discussed above – at the time of its acquisition, 
and notwithstanding that this right is enforceable insofar as the general partner is able to 
take legal action to protect its right to carried interest in terms of the partnership agreement 
(for example, by suing the limited partners for damages were the limited partners to revoke 
its right to carried interest prior to it exercising such right).  
 
In conclusion, on the authority of the Mooi case, it is submitted that the right to carried 
interest, acquired by the general partner at the fund’s inception, is a contingent right, to 
which the general partner is not unconditionally entitled, and which therefore does not 
accrue to the general partner in terms of paragraph (c). 
 
Conclusion: Determining the application of paragraph (c) to the taxation of the right to 
carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
 
The right to carried interest acquired by the general partner at fund inception, meets a 
number of the paragraph (c) criteria, namely: 
 it is an amount, meaning that it constitutes ‘property’ and it has an ‘ascertainable 
money value’; and 
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  it is acquired ‘in respect of services’ to be rendered as contemplated by paragraph 
(c).  
 
Given, however, as discussed above, the existence of the carried interest conditions, the 
right to carried interest is not an amount to which the general partner is unconditionally 
entitled.  Consequently, the right to carried interest does not constitute an amount that 
accrues to the general partner in respect of services to be rendered to the limited partners 
at fund inception.  It follows then that because the accrual requirement of paragraph (c) is 
not met, paragraph (c) does not apply to taxing the right to carried interest.  As previously 
discussed, paragraph (c) includes in gross income, inter alia, any amount accrued in 
respect of services rendered / to be rendered.  As the right to carried interest does not 
constitute an amount accrued, no amount falls to be included in the gross income of the 
general partner in respect of this right acquired at fund inception.  Consequently, there is 
no amount that can be subject to tax, with the result that the general partner will not be 
taxed on the right to carried interest at fund inception. 
 
3.4.5 Determining the application of paragraph (c) to the taxation of the distribution 
of carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement 
 
Paragraph (c) applies to include in gross income, inter alia, any amount received in respect 
of services rendered.  In section 3.4.3 above, it was determined that in legal substance the 
distribution of carried interest is an amount received by the general partner in respect of 
services rendered, as contemplated by paragraph (c).  Consequently, paragraph (c) will 
apply to the taxation of the distribution of carried interest and will include the distribution 
received in the gross income of the general partner.  Further, paragraph (c), will supersede 
the application of section 9C(2) to the taxation of the distribution of carried interest 
because paragraph (c) includes amounts received in gross income in respect of services 
rendered irrespective of whether such amounts are otherwise of a capital nature. 
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3.5  Tax implications of the distribution of carried interest based on the legal 
substance of a carried interest arrangement 
 
The proceeds that arise upon disposal of a portfolio company by the fund, which are 
allocated to the general partner, in terms of the fund partnership agreement will consist of 
the following: 
a) the return of the initial capital contributed to the fund by the general partner, which 
capital was used to acquire the general partner’s interest in the qualifying shares in 
the portfolio company
29
; 
b) proceeds which provide the general partner with a return on its investment capital 
sufficient to meet the pre-determined rate of return, that is, the hurdle rate of return;  
c) proceeds that are proportionate to the investment capital of the general partner; and  
d) the distribution of carried interest, that is, proceeds received which are 
disproportionate to the investment capital of the general partner. 
 
Of the total proceeds arising on disposal of a portfolio company by the fund, which are 
allocated to the general partner,
30
  the sum of the items described in points (a) – (c) above, 
represent the portion of such proceeds which do not constitute the distribution of carried 
interest.  It is submitted that section 9C(2) will apply to deem such proceeds (which do not 
constitute the distribution of carried interest) received by the general partner to be of a 
capital nature.  This is so, it is submitted, because such proceeds are, in terms of section 
9C(2), an amount received by the general partner in respect of its interest in the qualifying 
portfolio company shares. 
 
Moreover, as discussed in section 3.2.3, the base cost of the general partner’s interest in the 
qualifying portfolio company shares will, in terms of paragraph 20, be the capital 
contributed to the fund by the general partner, which capital was used to acquire the 
general partner’s interest in the qualifying portfolio company shares. 
                                                     
29
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the investment capital of the general partner’ 
30 Hereafter referred to as ‘realisation proceeds’ 
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Consequently, it is submitted that the general partner will be subject to capital gains tax at 
the effective rate of 18,67%, on a capital gain determined by deducting from the above-
mentioned portion of the realisation proceeds, which do not constitute the distribution of 
carried interest, the base cost, determined in terms of paragraph 20, of the general partner’s 
interest in the qualifying portfolio company shares.  Furthermore, as this portion of the 
realisation proceeds, which excludes the distribution of carried interest, does not constitute 
an amount received by the general partner in respect of services rendered to the limited 
partners, it is submitted that paragraph (c) will not apply to the taxation thereof.  
Consequently, it is further submitted, that treatment of these realisation proceeds on capital 
account in accordance with section 9C(2) will remain undisturbed. 
 
As already noted in section 3.4.5 above, paragraph (c) will apply to tax the distribution of 
carried interest received by the general partner, this being an amount received in respect of 
services rendered.  Moreover, as previously noted, paragraph (c) will supersede the 
application of section 9C, as paragraph (c) includes in gross income, amounts that would 
otherwise be of a capital nature.  Consequently, the distribution of carried interest received 
by the general partner will be included in its gross income in terms of paragraph (c) and 
will be subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%. 
 
The abovementioned tax implications are shown in the following illustrative example: 
Illustrative example 3: Tax implications of the distribution of carried interest based 
on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
Assume that the same facts apply as illustrative example 2 in section 3.2.3 above. That is, 
portfolio company A was acquired by the fund in year one, for R100 and was subsequently 
disposed of by the fund in year 5 for R300.  Furthermore, the general partner contributed 
R2 as its co-investment to the fund, which amount was used to acquire a 2% shareholding 
in portfolio company A (that is, the general partner, has an interest (equal to 2%) which 
cost R2, in the shareholding of the fund partnership, in portfolio company A).  Table 2, 
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from illustrative example 2, which shows the allocation and distribution of the realisation 
proceeds to the general partner, in year 5 is presented again below.  
Table 2 – ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REALISATION PROCEEDS TO GENERAL 
PARTNER 
Allocation and distribution type General partner 
Return of capital contributions  R2 
 
Hurdle return  R2 
Residual realisation proceeds allocated  R25 
Total realisation proceeds allocated  R29 (R2+ R2 +R25) 
Allocation of residual realisation 
proceeds in proportion to capital 
contribution of general partner 
 R2,50   
Distribution of carried interest  R22,5 (R25- R2,5) 
 
Assume further that the market value of the right to carried interest was determined to be 
R12 at fund inception. 
 
It is submitted that the tax implications for the general partner will then be as 
follows: 
At fund inception, as discussed in section 3.4.4 above, because the general partner is not 
unconditionally entitled to the right to carried interest, this right does not constitute an 
amount accrued to the general partner.  In terms of the definition of gross income in 
section 1 of the Act, for an amount to be included in gross income, among other things, it 
must be an amount received by or accrued to the taxpayer.  Because the acquisition of the 
right to carried interest by the general partner constitutes neither a receipt nor an accrual 
of an amount, because entitlement to the amount is not unconditional, no amount falls to be 
included in the general partner’s gross income in respect of the right, notwithstanding that 
the right may have an ascertainable money value (R12 market value in this example) at 
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fund inception.  In the result, the general partner will not be subject to taxation in respect 
of the right to carried interest, at fund inception. 
 
Thereafter, in year 5, when portfolio company A is disposed of and the realisation proceeds 
are distributed to the general partner: 
 The amount to be included in the gross income of the general partner in terms of 
paragraph (c) will be the R22,5 distribution of carried interest, this being in legal 
substance, an amount received by the general partner for services rendered
31
 by it to 
the limited partners.  This will result in the general partner being subject to normal 
tax of R6,30 (R22,5 x 28%) in year 5. 
 The amount of realisation proceeds received by the general partner, deemed to be 
of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2), in respect of its interest in the 
qualifying shares in portfolio company A, held by the tax transparent fund 
partnership, will be R6,50 (R29 total realisation proceeds – R22,5 distribution of 
carried interest).  Furthermore, in terms of paragraph 20, the general partner will 
deduct R2, being the base cost of its interest in the qualifying shares in portfolio 
company A, from the proceeds of R6,50.  This will result in a capital gain of R4,50 
(R6,50 – R2) for the general partner in year 5, which will be subject to capital gains 
tax of R1 (Rounded) (R4,50 x 18,67%) in year 5. 
 
3.6     Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it was determined that the legal form and associated tax implications of a 
carried interest arrangement do not accord with the arrangement’s legal substance and 
related tax implications.  
 
 
 
                                                     
31 Such services comprise the fund management services rendered and the service of the general partner undertaking 
unlimited 3rd party liability risk  
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With respect to the nature of the right to carried interest and the taxation thereof, it was 
explained that: 
 In legal form, the right to carried interest is the right of the general partner to share 
disproportionately, relative to its capital contributed to the fund, in fund 
partnership profits.  Further, it was noted, based on discussions with various 
private equity fund managers as well as tax practitioners that deal extensively with 
private equity transactions that almost invariably, the fund partnership agreement 
is silent as to why the general partner acquires the right to carried interest, and that 
there is no link between this right and the fund management services that are 
required to be performed by the general partner, as per this agreement.  
 
Based on its legal form, it was submitted that the right to carried interest is of a 
capital nature since it represents the right to future partnership profits, where the 
general partner is neither a dealer in carried interest rights, nor is the right to 
carried interest acquired by the general partner in respect of services rendered / to 
be rendered by the general partner to the limited partners.  
 
 It was explained that consequently, no tax liability arises in the hands of the 
general partner at fund inception, upon acquisition of the right to carried interest. 
This is because, in legal form, the right to carried interest is the acquisition of a 
right of a capital nature by the general partner which constitutes neither gross 
income of the general partner, nor a disposal event for capital gains tax purposes as 
per the Eighth Schedule 
 
 In legal substance, the right to carried interest is a reward acquired by the general 
partner at fund inception from the limited partners for services to be rendered by 
the former to the latter. It was established, however, that paragraph (c) does not 
apply to tax the right to carried interest as the right does not constitute an amount 
that accrues to the general partner at fund inception.  It was noted that this is 
because the general partner is not unconditionally entitled to the right at fund 
inception.  It was explained further that because no amount accrues in respect of 
the acquisition of the right to carried interest, in terms of paragraph (c), no amount 
falls to be included in the gross income of the general partner.  Consequently, it 
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was explained that the general partner is not subject to tax in respect of the 
acquisition of the right to carried interest, at fund inception. 
 
With respect to the nature of the distribution of carried interest and the taxation thereof, it 
was explained that: 
 In legal form, the distribution of carried interest is the receipt by the general 
partner, subject to certain conditions being met, of a disproportionate share32 of the 
proceeds realised by the fund partnership upon disposal of a portfolio company, 
which proceeds are received by it in its capacity as a partner.  As with the right to 
carried interest, almost invariably there is no link in the fund partnership 
agreement between the distribution received and the fund management services to 
be performed by the general partner, in terms of the fund partnership agreement.  
 
 It was explained that in terms of section 9C(2), amounts received by a taxpayer in 
 respect of the disposal of equity shares, held for a continuous period of at least three 
 years, are deemed to be of a capital nature.  On the basis that the investments of 
 private equity  funds tend to be held for 5 to 8 years before being disposed 
 (Financial Mail, 2014: 50), it was noted that proceeds received on disposal of a 
 portfolio company shareholding by a  fund partnership, will, almost invariably, be 
 deemed to be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2). 
   
 In this regard, based on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement, it was 
 further  explained that section 9C(2) read with paragraph 36 of Eighth Schedule will 
apply in deeming the full portfolio company realisation proceeds, allocated to the 
general partner in terms of the fund partnership agreement, to be of a capital nature.  
It was  noted  that this is because such realisation proceeds are received by the 
general partner in respect of its interest in the qualifying shares in the portfolio 
company, held by the tax transparent fund partnership.  It was discussed that in 
terms of paragraph 20, the base cost of the general partner’s interest in the 
qualifying shares in the portfolio company, is the capital contributed by the general 
                                                     
32
 Relative to the capital that it contributed to the fund 
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partner to the fund, which capital was used to acquire the general partner’s interest 
in these qualifying shares. 
 
 It was further discussed that as a result, the general partner will be subject to capital 
gains tax at the effective rate of 18,67%, on a capital gain determined as the 
difference between the portfolio company realisation proceeds received and the 
base cost, in terms of paragraph 20, of the general partner’s interest in the 
qualifying shares in the portfolio company.  It was noted that because the 
distribution of carried interest forms  part of the portfolio company realisation 
proceeds received by the general partner, the distribution will be included in the 
amount deemed to be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2) and will therefore 
also be included in the amount taxed at the effective rate of 18,67%.  Moreover, it 
was discussed, that because in legal form, the distribution of carried interest, is 
received in the capacity as partner, and not for services rendered, paragraph (c) 
does not apply to override the capital gains tax treatment afforded to the 
distribution of carried interest received by the general partner. 
 
 In legal substance, the distribution of carried interest is the receipt by the general 
partner of a fee from the limited partners for fund management services rendered 
by the former to the latter as well as for the service rendered to the limited partners 
of undertaking to accept third party unlimited liability risk for the debts of the fund 
partnership.  
It was further explained that paragraph (c) applies to the taxation of the distribution 
of carried interest received by the general partner.  This is because the distribution 
is an amount received in respect of services rendered, in terms of paragraph (c), by 
the general partner to the limited partners.  Further, it was noted that paragraph (c), 
overrides section 9C(2) in taxing the distribution of carried interest because 
paragraph (c) includes in gross income amounts that are of a capital nature.  It was 
discussed that upon receipt of the portfolio company realisation proceeds by the 
general partner, the portion that comprises the distribution of carried interest will 
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be included in the gross income of the general partner in terms of paragraph (c) 
and will be subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%. 
 
To conclude, where a carried interest arrangement is taxed in accordance with its legal 
form, the right to carried interest, acquired by the general partner at fund inception, will not 
be taxed, while the distribution of carried interest received by the general partner will be 
taxed upon receipt, at the effective capital gains tax rate of 18,67%.  Conversely, where a 
carried interest arrangement is taxed in accordance with its legal substance, there will be 
no taxation of the right to carried interest acquired by the general partner at fund inception, 
while the distribution of carried interest received by the general partner will subject to 
normal tax upon receipt, at the higher tax rate of 28%. 
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4  The analysis of the appropriateness and adequacy of South 
African tax law in respect of private equity carried interest and 
recommendation for taxation reform 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, it was determined that in legal substance, a carried interest arrangement is a 
fee arrangement in which the general partner is remunerated for services rendered / to be 
rendered to the limited partners by acquiring the right to and receiving the distribution of 
carried interest. In the light of this legal substance of a carried interest arrangement, this 
chapter will analyse and determine how appropriate and adequate the existing South 
African law is in taxing carried interest. 
 
The appropriateness of paragraph (c) and of section 9C, as discussed in chapter 3, in taxing 
carried interest, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement, will first be 
determined.  Thereafter, how adequate paragraph (c) and case law dealing with the 
interpretation and application of paragraph (c) 
33
, as discussed in chapter 3, are, for the 
purposes of taxing carried interest will be evaluated, based on the legal substance of a 
carried interest arrangement.  In order to facilitate this evaluation, the common law 
remedies available to the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
34 
to 
challenge the legal form of a carried interest arrangement in court so as to ensure that 
carried interest is taxed in terms of paragraph (c), will be examined. 
 
The chapter will conclude by providing a recommendation for specific carried interest 
legislation where the law is found wanting. 
 
                                                     
33
 Hereafter referred to as ‘paragraph (c ) and case law’ 
34
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Commissioner’ 
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4.2 Determining the appropriateness of paragraph (c) and section 9C in 
taxing carried interest  
 
Overview 
 
It is submitted that the criterion to determine the appropriateness of paragraph (c) and 
section 9C respectively, in taxing carried interest, is whether the application of each 
provision, respectively, enables the correct taxing result to be achieved, based on the legal 
substance of a carried interest distribution.  As discussed previously, in legal substance, a 
carried interest distribution is a performance fee received by the general partner from the 
limited partners for services rendered by the former to the latter.  In this regard, it is 
submitted that the correct taxing result for the distribution of carried interest is for the 
distribution to be subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%
35
, as would apply to other forms 
of compensation received for services rendered. 
 
Determining the appropriateness of section 9C in taxing carried interest  
 
In this regard, as discussed previously, section 9C determines the tax consequences based 
on the legal form of the distribution of carried interest.  To reiterate, in legal form, the 
distribution of carried interest represents the general partner’s disproportionate share of the 
proceeds realised by the fund partnership upon disposal of a portfolio company.  As 
previously noted, section 9C deems the full portfolio company realisation proceeds 
allocated to the general partner in terms of the fund partnership agreement, which include 
the distribution of carried interest, to be of a capital nature.  Consequently, section 9C 
seeks to tax the distribution of carried interest as a capital gain in the hands of the general 
partner, in accordance with its legal form.  This will result in the distribution being subject 
to capital gains tax at the effective capital gains tax rate of 18,67%. 
 
                                                     
35
 As previously noted, 28% is the tax rate applicable where the general partner is a company, assuming the structure – as 
depicted in Figure 1 of Chapter 2 – applies. 
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Accordingly, it is submitted that section 9C is inappropriate in taxing the distribution of 
carried interest as this provision seeks to tax the distribution of carried interest on capital 
account in accordance with its legal form and not in accordance with its legal substance.  
Thus, taxation of the distribution of carried interest in accordance with section 9C does not 
achieve the correct taxing result.  That is, the distribution of carried interest is taxed as a 
capital gain at the lower effective capital gains tax rate of 18,67% rather than being subject 
to normal tax at the higher rate of 28%. 
 
Determining the appropriateness of paragraph (c) in taxing carried interest  
 
It is submitted that the distribution of carried interest is taxed appropriately in terms of 
paragraph (c).  This is so, it is submitted, because paragraph (c) taxes the distribution of 
carried interest in accordance with its legal substance as a fee received from the limited 
partners.  In this regard, paragraph (c) includes in the gross income of the general partner, 
as service based compensation, the distribution of carried interest, which is then subject to 
normal tax at the rate of 28% in the hands of the general partner.  This will be the tax 
result, notwithstanding, as discussed above, that in legal form, the distribution of carried 
interest will be deemed to be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C.  This is because 
paragraph (c) includes in gross income, inter alia, any amount received in respect of 
services rendered, irrespective of whether such amount is of a capital nature.  
 
Thus, it is submitted, that paragraph (c) achieves the correct and appropriate taxing result 
for the distribution of carried interest, based on its legal substance.  That is, taxation of the 
carried interest distribution as a fee received by the general partner from the limited 
partners, subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%.  
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4.3  Determining the adequacy of paragraph (c) and case law in taxing 
carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement 
4.3.1 Establishing the criteria to determine the adequacy of paragraph (c) and case 
law for taxing carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement 
 
It is submitted that how adequately paragraph (c) and case law taxes carried interest, based 
on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement
36
, may be assessed by 
benchmarking it against certain of the commonly accepted principles of a good tax system.  
It was Adam Smith who penned the maxims (or principles) of taxation in his book The 
Wealth of Nations: Volume 2, which have subsequently influenced tax policy design 
(Stiglingh et al, 2015: 1157). 
 
In this regard, it is further submitted that the following principles of a good tax system, 
serve as appropriate criteria to assess the adequacy of paragraph (c) and case law in the 
taxation of carried interest, based on the legal substance of the arrangement: 
 The certainty principle: The timing and amount of tax payments should be certain. 
 The convenience principle: Taxes should be imposed in a manner or at a time that 
is convenient for taxpayers. 
 The administrative efficiency principle: The tax system should be designed in such 
a manner as not to impose an unreasonable administrative burden on the taxpayer 
and the Revenue Authorities. (Stiglingh et al, 2015: 1157.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
36
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the arrangement’ 
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4.3.2 Determining the adequacy of paragraph (c) in taxing carried interest based on 
the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
.  
Criterion: Does the existing law satisfy the certainty principle criterion 
 
Certainty of timing of taxation 
 
As regards the timing of the taxation of the right to carried interest, as was discussed in 
section 3.4.4 above, case law, in particular the Mooi case, clearly lays down the principle 
that when a right is acquired, the enforcement of which is subject to conditions, the right is 
contingent and no accrual thereof occurs until the condition is satisfied.  Because of the 
carried interest conditions, it was determined in section 3.4.4, that the right to carried 
interest is such a contingent right, with the result that this right clearly does not accrue to 
the general partner at fund inception. 
 
Consequently, in section 3.4.4, it was concluded that paragraph (c), does not apply to the 
taxation of the right to carried interest, acquired by the general partner at fund inception, 
because this right acquired does not constitute an amount accrued in respect of services 
rendered / to be rendered in terms of paragraph (c).  As a result, as discussed in section 
3.4.4, the general partner is not subject to taxation in respect of the right to carried interest, 
acquired at fund inception. 
 
As regards the timing of the taxation of the distribution of carried interest, as discussed in 
section 3.4.5, the distribution of carried interest is taxed upon receipt by the general partner 
in terms of paragraph (c), being an amount received in respect of services rendered.  
 
It may therefore be concluded that based on the legal substance of the arrangement, there is 
certainty as to the timing of the taxation of carried interest in terms of paragraph (c).  This 
is because no taxation is levied in respect of the right to carried interest in terms of 
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paragraph (c), at fund inception, while the distribution of carried interest is taxed upon 
receipt thereof by the general partner, in terms of paragraph (c). 
 
Certainty as to amount of taxation 
 
For the reasons discussed in the paragraphs above, paragraph (c) does not apply to the 
taxation of the right to carried interest, with the result that no tax is leviable in respect of 
this right acquired by the general partner at fund inception.  Consequently, based on the 
legal substance of the arrangement, there is certainty as to the amount of tax leviable (that 
is, no tax is leviable) in respect of the acquisition of the right to carried interest, in terms of 
paragraph (c). 
 
Furthermore, in terms of paragraph (c), based on the legal substance of the arrangement, as 
regards the taxation of the distribution of carried interest received, it is submitted that there 
is certainty as to the amount of tax leviable on the general partner.  This is because the tax 
levied on the distribution of carried interest is calculated by applying a single rate of tax of 
28% to a taxable amount which is a cash sum received by the general partner. 
 
Criterion: Does the existing law satisfy the convenience principle criterion 
 
Because paragraph (c) does not apply in taxing the general partner’s right to carried 
interest at fund inception, the general partner is not placed in the inconvenient and 
inequitable position of having to fund a potentially large tax debt in a cashless transaction, 
that is, prior to having received the distribution of carried interest.  
 
Moreover, because the general partner’s right to carried interest is not taxed at fund 
inception, the general partner will not be placed in the inconvenient and inequitable 
position of: 
 being taxed on the market value of the right to carried interest and then 
subsequently receiving, as a distribution of carried interest, an amount which is 
less than the aforementioned market value of the right to carried interest; or 
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 being taxed on the market value of the right to carried interest and then receiving 
no distribution of carried interest if the carried interest conditions are not satisfied. 
 
The tax position described in the two bullet points immediately above would be especially 
problematic for the general partner given, that in such cases, it is submitted, there would be 
no mechanism in the Act: 
 which would ensure that the amount ultimately taxed in the hands of the general 
partner would be the distribution of carried interest, in circumstances where this 
distribution was less than the value of the right to carried interest taxed at fund 
inception; or 
 which would ensure that no amount is ultimately taxed in the hands of the general 
partner, where no distribution of carried interest was received by the general 
partner. 
 
To conclude, when dealing with the legal substance of the arrangement, because the 
application of paragraph (c) results in the taxation of carried interest being levied such that 
the incidence of the taxation follows the cash flow, that is, the distribution of carried 
interest, taxation is imposed at a time that is convenient for the general partner to make 
payment thereof, which results in the general partner being taxed on an equitable basis.  
Thus, it is submitted, that taxation of carried interest in terms of paragraph (c), satisfies the 
convenience criterion. 
 
Criterion: Does the existing law satisfy the administrative efficiency principle criterion 
 
Given, as discussed above, that paragraph (c) does not apply in taxing the right to carried 
interest, at fund inception; the following administrative burdens do not arise when taxing 
carried interest in terms of paragraph (c): 
 The Commissioner is relieved of the complex, time consuming and expensive task 
of valuing the right to carried interest at fund inception: 
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- before an assessment can be raised to tax the general partner on the 
estimated market value of the right to carried interest, should the general 
partner neglect to include the right to carried interest as an accrual in its tax 
return, or 
- where the Commissioner disagrees with the value of the right to carried 
interest as determined by the general partner and reflected in its tax return. 
 The taxpayer, that is, the general partner, is relieved of the onerous and expensive 
task of having to determine a market value for the right to carried interest at fund 
inception, to be included as an accrual in its tax return. 
 
It may therefore be concluded that taxation of carried interest in terms of paragraph (c), 
based on the legal substance of the arrangement, satisfies the administrative efficiency 
principle criterion. 
 
4.3.3   Conclusion: Determining the adequacy of paragraph (c) and case law in taxing 
carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement 
 
It may be concluded that paragraph (c) and case law are adequate in taxing both the right to 
and the distribution of carried interest, when applied to the legal substance of the 
arrangement. This is because – as was established in section 4.3.2 – application of 
paragraph (c) and case law, based on the arrangement’s legal substance, satisfies the 
following criteria: the certainty principle criterion; the convenience principle criterion and 
the administrative efficiency criterion. 
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4.4  Examination of the common law remedies for challenging the legal form 
of a carried interest arrangement 
4.4.1 Overview 
  
It is important to note that the conclusion reached, in 4.3.3, that paragraph (c) and case 
law, are adequate for the purposes of taxing carried interest was made on the basis that 
paragraph (c) automatically applied to the taxation of carried interest.  That is, on the 
basis that effect would automatically be given to the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement rather than its legal form.  
 
It is submitted, however, that where the Commissioner taxes the general partner on the 
distribution of carried interest in terms of paragraph (c) and the general partner objects to 
and appeals the assessment of the Commissioner, the Commissioner will need to resort to 
litigation in order for a court to confirm the assessment, thus ensuring that the distribution 
is indeed taxed in terms of paragraph (c).  More particularly, a court, in confirming the 
Commissioner’s assessment, will need to be satisfied that in legal substance, a carried 
interest arrangement constitutes a fee arrangement between the general partner and the 
limited partners, and that this legal substance differs from the legal form of the carried 
interest arrangement.  
  
Only then, it is submitted, will a court overrule the legal form and give effect to the legal 
substance of the carried interest arrangement and its associated paragraph (c) tax 
consequences. In this regard, the Commissioner has two ‘substance over form’ common 
law remedies available to it, to tax carried interest based on the legal substance of a carried 
interest arrangement.  These remedies, namely: the ‘simulation test’ and ‘the label test’ are 
discussed hereunder. 
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4.4.2 The simulation test 
What is the simulation test? 
 
The simulation test seeks to determine whether the transaction under scrutiny is a sham or 
simulated transaction: one whose true nature the parties deliberately conceal.  Such a 
transaction is a dishonest one and the courts will give effect to it by analysing the true 
intention of the parties, rending aside its disguise and assessing the transaction accordingly. 
(Surtees and Millard, 2004: 15.)  More precisely, the court will determine the nature of the 
real transaction and will attach the tax consequences to it (De Koker and Williams, 2015: 
para 24.51).  
 
It is submitted that successful application of the simulation test to a carried interest 
arrangement, requires that a court be satisfied that the legal form of the carried interest 
arrangement is a deliberate disguise by the general partner and limited partners in order to 
conceal the true nature of their transaction.  The court will then give effect to the real 
transaction between the parties, and will implement the tax consequences that flow from 
the real transaction.  
 
Consequently, if the Commissioner is able successfully to apply the simulation test to a 
carried interest arrangement, it is submitted that the court will give effect to the true 
transaction between the general partner and the limited partners, that is, the legal substance 
of the arrangement, which is a fee arrangement, and will overrule the simulated legal form 
of the transaction.   Therefore, the court will confirm the assessment of the Commissioner, 
in terms of which the Commissioner taxed the general partner on the distribution of carried 
interest received in terms of paragraph (c). 
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What are the criteria for determining whether a particular transaction is simulated? 
 
It was held in Zandberg v Van Zyl  1910 AD 302  (at 309) that the criterion for simulation 
is whether the parties to the agreement in question intended that it was to have ‘effect 
according to its tenor’ and that if they did so intend, then the agreement was not 
‘simulated’ or ‘disguised’. Moreover, when faced with an alleged simulated transaction, it 
was stated (at 309) that : 
‘ The Court must be satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs from 
the simulated intention.’  
 
In Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers and Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 
369, it was held (at 395 -396) that a disguised transaction: 
‘ … is a dishonest transaction: dishonest in as much as the parties to it do not really intend it to have 
inter partes, the legal effect which its terms convey to the outside world.  The parties wish to hide the 
fact that their agreement or transaction falls within the prohibition or is subject to the tax, and so they 
dress it up in a guise which conveys the impression that it is outside the prohibition or not subject to 
the tax. Such a transaction is said to be in fraudem legis, and is interpreted by the Courts in 
accordance with what is found to be the real agreement or transaction between the parties.  Of course 
before the Court can find that a transaction is in fraudem legis in the above sense, it must be satisfied 
that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding between the parties.’ 
 
In Erf 3183/1, Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR 1996 (3) SA 942 (A), 58 SATC 229,    
(‘the Ladysmith case’), counsel for the appellant had argued that the parties in question had 
actually intended the agreements to have effect according to their tenor and this was the 
end of the matter, since effect must be given to the agreements as intended (Hutchison and 
Hutchison, 2014: 76). 
 
 The Judge of Appeal disagreed, holding (at 953B-C) that: 
‘This is plainly not so. That the parties did indeed cast their arrangement in the form mentioned, must 
of course be accepted; that after all, is what they had been advised to do. The real question is, 
however, whether they actually intended that each agreement would inter partes have effect according 
to its tenor. If not, effect must be given to what the transaction really is.’ 
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In the Ladysmith case, Hefer JA reached the conclusion (at 956E-F) that the provisions of 
the contracts ‘bore the stamp of simulation’ and that a purpose of concealing what the 
parties truly intended could be inferred.  Consequently, it was held (at 956F-G) that the 
appellants had not escaped liability for tax.  According to Hutchison and Hutchison (2014: 
77), in the Ladysmith case, although the motive or purpose of avoiding tax was 
permissible, the transaction by which it was effected was not genuine since there was no 
true intention in actual fact to create the rights its provisions purported to create. 
 
Much confusion was, however, created as to the criteria for determining a simulated 
transaction in the Supreme Court of Appeal case of C:SARS v NWK Ltd 2011 (2) SA 67 
(SCA),73 SATC 55 (the NWK case) where Lewis AJ apparently broadened the scope of 
the test for simulation in holding (at 55) that: 
‘… the test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether there is an intention to give effect to 
a contract in accordance with its terms. … The test should thus go further and require an 
examination of the commercial sense of the transaction: of its real substance and purpose. If the 
purpose of the transaction is only to achieve an object that allows the evasion of a 
peremptory law, then it will be regarded as simulated.’ (Emphasis Added) 
 
Many commentators were critical of the judgment in the NWK case, arguing that in 
allowing the tax purpose of a contractual arrangement to trump the true intention of the 
parties, the court had gone well beyond the well established doctrine of substance over 
form, and had in fact created new law (Daniels, 2013: 14). 
 
The fog of confusion that had prevailed in regard to what constitutes a simulated 
transaction, since the decision in the NWK case was subsequently cleared by the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 
and others 2014 All SA 654 (SCA) (the Roshcon case).  The significance of Wallis JA’s 
judgment in the Roshcon case was, firstly, that he rejected the proposition that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in the NWK case had taken the law in a ‘new direction’, and secondly, that 
he affirmed the traditional view that the essence of a simulated transaction is that it 
involves a disguise (Williams and Wilson, 2014: 3). 
 72 
 
 
In this regard, Wallis JA held (at para 22 – 36) that the reasoning of Lewis AJ in the NWK 
case cannot be read in isolation and should be read with reference to the entire judgment 
and the particular facts of that case.  Furthermore, the fundamental principles laid down in 
previous cases, that there be an element of dishonesty or an intention to disguise the true 
nature of an agreement, in order for simulation to be present, remain undisturbed.  In the 
light of this, Wallis JA concluded (at para 37) that: 
‘ … the notion that NWK transforms our law in relation to simulated transactions, or requires more 
of a court faced with a contention that a transaction is simulated than a careful analysis of all 
matters surrounding the transaction, including its commercial purpose, if any, is incorrect. The 
position remains that the court examines the transaction as a whole, including all surrounding 
circumstances, any unusual features of the transaction and the manner in which the parties intend 
to implement it, before determining in any particular case whether a transaction is simulated’ 
 
 
Application of the simulation test to a carried interest arrangement 
 
Based on the dicta of leading tax cases, as discussed above, dealing with the criteria for 
determining simulation, it is submitted that for the Commissioner successfully to apply the 
simulation test to a carried interest arrangement, a court would need to be satisfied that the 
general partner and the limited partners
37
 did not truly intend that the terms of the fund 
partnership agreement, pertaining to carried interest, be given effect to according to their 
tenor. 
 
More particularly, it is submitted that the court would need to be satisfied that the parties 
did not intend the distribution of carried interest to be a disproportionate partnership profit 
share received by the general partner.  Differently put, it is submitted, that the court would 
need to be satisfied that the real intention of the parties in entering into the carried interest 
arrangement, which was purposely disguised by the parties, was for the general partner to 
                                                     
37
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the parties’ 
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receive the distribution of carried interest as a fee paid to it by the limited partners for 
services rendered to them. 
 
It is clear from the paragraphs above that a faked (that is, a dishonest or fraudulent) 
intention is required to label a transaction a simulated transaction.  In this regard, because 
the taxpayer, that is, the general partner, would be contesting the assessment of the 
Commissioner, the onus of proof
38
 that its intention is not faked and that the transaction is 
not simulated, would rest with the general partner in terms of section 102 of the Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011
39
 (Hutchison and Hutchison, 2014: 76). 
 
In order to discharge this onus, it is submitted that the general partner would need to satisfy 
a court that the parties had genuinely intended that the fund partnership agreement, in so 
far as it dealt with carried interest, was to be given effect to in accordance with its tenor.  It 
is further submitted that a court would be so satisfied, and the onus discharged, by the 
general partner simply providing evidence to the court that the parties to the carried interest 
arrangement, carried out their respective obligations and enforced their respective rights in 
accordance with the relevant contractual terms governing carried interest in the fund 
partnership agreement. 
 
With the general partner having discharged this onus, it is further submitted that the onus 
of proving that the parties did not genuinely intend that the fund partnership agreement, in 
so far as it dealt with carried interest, was to be given effect to, in accordance with its 
terms, would then shift to the party alleging the simulation, that is the Commissioner.  In 
this regard, it is submitted that the Commissioner would have considerable difficulty in 
successfully applying the simulation test to a carried interest arrangement.  This is because 
the general partner, as discussed in the paragraph above, would already have satisfied the 
court, that the intention of the parties to the carried interest arrangement was genuine and 
                                                     
38
 Hereafter referred to as ‘ the onus’ 
39 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Tax Administration Act’ 
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that each party actually intended that the fund partnership agreement, in so far as carried 
interest was concerned, would, inter partes, have effect according to its tenor. 
 
4.4.3 The label test 
  
What is the label test? 
 
This refers to the situation where bona fide transactions must nevertheless still be 
construed in accordance with their legal substance, rather than their legal form, where 
parties have mistakenly applied the wrong label to their transaction. Unlike a simulated 
transaction, no dishonesty attaches to such a transaction, but the courts will nevertheless 
analyse its legal substance in applying the correct label to the transaction. (Hutchison and 
Hutchison, 2014: 70 and Surtees and Millard, 2004: 15.).  Consequently, the court will 
enforce the tax consequences based on the correct label applied to the transaction 
(Brincker and De Koker, 2010: para 46.7). 
 
In this regard, in ITC 1833 70 SATC 238, it was stated (at 249) that:  
‘The law on the subject of simulated transactions also includes the principle that notwithstanding that the 
parties may honestly intend to enter, and may bona fide think that they are entering into a contract of a 
particular nature and in no way are fraudulent or have an improper claim and the agreement is not 
designedly disguised, the court may nonetheless, on an analysis of the relevant facts conclude that in fact 
the agreement is not what it purports to be but that there is some other agreement.’ 
 
Moreover, in Tucker v Ginsberg 1962 (2) ALL SA 31 (W), it was stated (at 36) that: 
‘As each party has given the transaction a different label, I think that it is appropriate to add here that the 
label used is not decisive. Despite the label, the Court must look at the nature of the transaction, and in 
ascertaining its nature the Court must have regard mainly to its substance and not merely its form.’ 
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Application of the label test to a carried interest arrangement 
 
It is submitted that in order for the Commissioner successfully to apply the label test to a 
carried interest arrangement, a court will need to be satisfied that: 
 The parties to the arrangement have mistakenly characterised / labelled the 
distribution of carried interest, in accordance with its legal form, as the allocation 
to the general partner of a disproportionate share of gains made by the fund 
partnership upon disposal of a portfolio company. 
 In legal substance, the distribution of carried interest is a fee received by the 
general partner from the limited partners for services rendered by the former to 
the latter.  
 
In other words, the court will need to be satisfied that the label attached to the carried 
interest arrangement, based on its legal form, is incorrect, because the legal substance of 
the arrangement strongly suggests that the carried interest arrangement is more 
appropriately characterised as a fee arrangement between the general partner and the 
limited partners. 
 
 
It is submitted that the Commissioner will have strong grounds for arguing that in legal 
substance, a carried interest arrangement is a fee arrangement between the general partner 
and the limited partners, and that its characterisation, in terms of its legal form, as a 
partnership profit sharing arrangement is incorrect.  This is because the Commissioner 
will, it is submitted, be able to raise a number of the cogent arguments supporting carried 
interest as service related compensation, which arguments were analysed in section 3.3.2 
above; the most pertinent of which, are, to reiterate: 
 That the general partner does not receive the carried interest in return for any 
corresponding capital contribution; instead, the carried interest is based solely on 
the general partner’s performance (Dauds, 2007: 11). 
 That the motive for the limited partners granting the general partner the right to and 
thereafter transferring to the general partner, such a significant portion of the fund’s 
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realisation profits as carried interest, must surely be as a reward for the latter’s 
performance, that is, for services rendered (Dauds, 2007: 11).  Differently put why 
else, it is submitted, would the limited partners, who are dealing with the general 
partner at arm’s length, in a commercial transaction, forgo such a material share of 
fund realisation profits that they are otherwise entitled to, based on their significant 
capital contributions, if not to remunerate the general partner for services rendered. 
 That the limited partners waive a portion of their profits to incentivise the general 
partner to work actively to create value in the private equity fund (Bergkvist et al, 
2014: 143).  It follows that the carried interest actually represents compensation for 
services rendered by the general partner, more particularly performance fees earned 
(Dauds, 2007: 11 and Horak, 2007: 5). 
 
 The description of carried interest in the glossary to the KPMG and SAVCA 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry Performance Survey of South Africa 
covering the 2014 calendar year, where it is described as: 
 ‘… a fee enhancement for a private equity fund manager for achieving a benchmark 
return or hurdle rate.’ (Emphasis Added) 
 
 
Moreover, in section 3.3.3, the arguments advanced by various commentators and industry 
players as to why carried interest is not service related compensation of the general partner 
were discussed and analysed.  To reiterate, these parties argued that carried interest is not 
remuneration of the general partner for services rendered to the limited partners because: 
 it represents an enhanced investment reward / return to compensate the general 
partner for the higher risk to which its co-investment in the fund is exposed 
compared to that of the limited partners’ investments in the fund; 
 it represents the reward of the general partner for assuming the additional risk of  
unlimited liability to third parties for the debts of the fund, and 
 the services provided to the limited partners of the fund are performed not by the 
general partner, but rather by the key executives of the private equity management 
compan (refer PE ManCo in Figure 1 of chapter 2), which company is fully 
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remunerated for such services on an arm’s length basis by charging a management 
fee which is fully taxable 
 
It will be recalled that, upon examination, in section 3.3.3, none of these arguments held up 
to scrutiny, which, it is submitted, lends further support to the Commissioner’s contention 
that, in legal substance, the distribution of carried interest, represents service related 
compensation of the general partner.  Because the general partner will be contesting the 
assessment of the Commissioner, and in accordance with section 102 of the Tax 
Administration Act, it is further submitted that the onus of proof that the Commissioner’s 
assessment is incorrect will rest with the taxpayer, that is, the general partner. 
 
It may therefore be concluded that the Commissioner will likely succeed in applying the 
label test to a carried interest arrangement.  That is to say, a court will likely find in favour 
of the Commissioner and hold that the parties to the carried interest arrangement have 
mistakenly characterised the distribution of carried interest in accordance with its legal 
form as a partnership profit sharing arrangement, and that the distribution must be 
characterised based on its legal substance as a fee arrangement.   
 
Consequently, it is submitted, that a court will overrule the legal form of the carried 
interest arrangement and give effect to the legal substance thereof such that the correct 
label / categorisation of the arrangement as a fee arrangement between the general partner 
and the limited partners will be applied with its attendant tax implications.  Thus, the court 
will confirm the Commissioner’s assessment, in terms of which, the distribution of carried 
interest, received by the general partner, is taxed in terms of paragraph (c). 
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4.4  Conclusion: Analysis of the appropriateness and adequacy of the 
taxation of carried interest 
 
Appropriateness of the taxation of carried interest 
 
It maybe concluded that paragraph (c) is an appropriate taxing provision for carried 
interest as it achieves the correct taxing result based on the legal substance of a carried 
interest arrangement.  That is, paragraph (c) taxes the distribution of carried interest, in 
accordance with its legal substance, as service related compensation of the general partner, 
which is subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%. 
 
Furthermore, it may be concluded that section 9C is an inappropriate taxing provision for 
carried interest as it applies to deem the distribution of carried interest received by the 
general partner to be proceeds of a capital nature based on the legal form, rather than the 
legal substance of a carried interest arrangement.  Consequently, section 9C does not 
achieve the correct taxing result based on the legal substance of a carried interest 
arrangement. 
 
Adequacy of the taxation of carried interest 
 
It is submitted that paragraph (c) and associated case law are inadequate in taxing carried 
interest.  Although, as was discussed in section 4.3.3, paragraph (c) and case law were 
found to be adequate in the taxation of carried interest, based on the legal substance of a 
carried interest arrangement, crucially, as was explained in section 4.4.1, the legal 
substance of a carried interest arrangement does not automatically prevail over its legal 
form.  
 
This has the important consequence that paragraph (c) does not automatically apply to 
the taxation of carried interest.  Instead, in circumstances where the general partner objects 
against and appeals the Commissioner’s assessment, the Commissioner will be forced to 
litigate the matter in order for a court to confirm its assessment, thus ensuring that carried 
interest is taxed appropriately, in accordance with paragraph (c).  More precisely, a court 
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will overrule the legal form of a carried interest arrangement where the Commissioner 
successfully applies the simulation test or the label test.  In this regard, it was discussed in 
section 4.4.2, that the Commissioner will likely have considerable difficulty in successfully 
applying the simulation test to a carried interest arrangement, while in section 4.4.3, it was 
submitted that the Commissioner will likely succeed in applying the label test to a carried 
interest arrangement. 
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that paragraph (c) and case law are inadequate in taxing 
carried interest because paragraph (c) and case law do not apply in taxing carried interest 
based on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement.  Consequently, in order for the 
Commissioner to ensure that carried interest is taxed appropriately in terms of paragraph 
(c), where the general partner objects against and appeals the Commissioner’s assessment, 
the Commissioner requires a court to confirm its assessment by overruling the legal form 
of a carried interest arrangement, which is costly both in terms of time and money.   
Moreover, even though, as discussed in section 4.4.3, it appears likely that the 
Commissioner will succeed in applying the label test to a carried interest arrangement, it is 
submitted, that any matter subject to litigation has some degree of uncertainty attached to 
it.  Consequently, it is submitted that in instances where the general partner objects and 
appeals against its assessment, the Commissioner will never have absolute assurance of a 
favourable outcome, that is, that its assessment will be confirmed by a court.  
 
4.5  Recommendation for reform of the taxation of carried interest 
 
Overview 
 
In section 4.4 it was concluded that paragraph (c) is appropriate as regards the taxation of 
carried interest, given that application of this paragraph (c), results in the distribution of 
carried interest being subject to normal tax at a rate of 28%, in accordance with its legal 
substance as a fee received.  It was established, however, that paragraph (c) is inadequate 
for the purposes of taxing carried interest because expensive and time consuming litigation 
is necessary in order for the Commissioner to ensure its application when taxing carried 
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interest where the general partner objects and appeals against the Commissioner’s 
assessment.  It follows, therefore, that new legislation is required that would tax carried 
interest appropriately, that is, based on its legal substance, but without having to resort to 
the courts to ensure its application, as is currently the position with paragraph (c), where 
the general partner objects to and appeals the Commissioner’s assessment. 
 
Recommendation for new legislation  
 
It is recommended that a new provision be inserted after section 8C, namely section 8D 
that, broadly stated, includes in the income of the general partner of a private equity fund, 
the distribution of carried interest received, which would then be subject to normal tax at 
the rate of 28% (assuming the general partner is a company). 
 
 
More particularly it is recommended that:  
 Section 8D apply to the general partner of a ‘private equity fund’, organised as an 
en commandite partnership, of which the general partner serves as the ‘fund 
manager’. 
 Both ‘private equity fund’ and ‘fund manager’ be defined terms in section 8D. In 
this regard, ‘fund manager’ could be defined with reference to a non–exhaustive 
list of typical functions, duties and responsibilities performed by the general partner 
of a private equity fund. 
 In terms of section 8D, all amounts allocated to and received by the general partner, 
in terms of the fund partnership agreement, in respect of an interest held by the 
general partner in qualifying shares of the fund partnership, be included in the 
income of the general partner,  
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EXCEPT FOR: 
so much of the amount allocated to and received by the general partner in respect of its 
interest in qualifying shares of the fund partnership which: 
a) represents the return of capital contributed by the general partner to the fund, 
which capital was used to acquire the general partner’s interest in the  
qualifying shares; 
b)  provides the general partner with a pre-determined rate of return on capital 
invested by it in the fund partnership (that is, the hurdle rate of return), as 
specified in the fund partnership agreement; and 
c) provides the general partner with a share of proceeds from the disposal of 
qualifying shares which is proportionate to the capital contributed to the 
fund by the general partner.
40
  
 
 
It is submitted that section 8D would be an appropriate taxing provision for carried interest 
as it would achieve the same taxing result for carried interest, as paragraph (c) currently 
does, based on the legal substance of a carried interest arrangement.  This is because in 
terms of section 8D, the portfolio company realisation proceeds
41
 received by the general 
partner which would be included in its income, would be the distribution of carried 
interest, which would then be subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%.  Furthermore, in 
terms of section 8D, the realisation proceeds received, which do not constitute the 
distribution of carried interest, comprised of the sum of the items described in points a) – 
c) above; namely, the return of fund capital, the hurdle return, and the proportionate 
proceeds, would be excluded from the application of section 8D.  Accordingly, these 
realisation proceeds would be deemed to be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2) 
and would be subject to capital gains tax, as explained in section 3.5 above. 
 
Moreover, it is submitted that section 8D would also be an adequate provision for the 
purposes of taxing carried interest.  This is because section 8D would implicitly recognise 
                                                     
40
 Hereafter referred to as  ‘the proportionate proceeds’ 
41 Hereafter referred to as ‘realisation proceeds’ 
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the receipt by the general partner, of the distribution of carried interest, as being a fee 
received by the general partner for services rendered to the limited partners, which fee 
would automatically be included in the income of the general partner, and would therefore 
be subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%.  Thus, by not explicitly requiring any link to 
exist between the receipt of the carried interest distribution and the services rendered by 
the general partner, as is required for paragraph (c) to apply, it is submitted that section 8D 
would apply directly in taxing carried interest in accordance with the legal substance of a 
carried interest arrangement, notwithstanding its legal form.  Accordingly, if section 8D 
were to be included in the Act, it is submitted that the Commissioner would not need to 
resort to expensive and time consuming litigation to ensure that carried interest is taxed 
appropriately, in accordance with its legal substance, as is currently the case with 
paragraph (c), in instances where the general partner objects to and appeals the 
Commissioner’s assessment. 
 
 
4.6     Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the appropriateness and adequacy of the existing law as regards the taxation 
of carried interest was evaluated and a recommendation for reform of the law was made 
where the law was found wanting. 
 
It was concluded that paragraph (c) is appropriate for the purposes of taxing carried 
interest.  This is because it achieves the correct taxing result based on the legal substance 
of a carried interest arrangement. That is, paragraph (c) taxes the distribution of carried 
interest, in accordance with its legal substance, as service related compensation of the 
general partner, subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%.  In contrast to paragraph (c), it 
was concluded that section 9C is an inappropriate provision for the purposes of taxing 
carried interest as it applies to deem the distribution of carried interest to be proceeds of a 
capital nature based on its legal form, and does not tax the distribution based on its legal 
substance. 
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It was discussed that, prima facie, paragraph (c) and related case law appear adequate in 
taxing carried interest based on its legal substance, this being a fee arrangement between 
the general partner and the limited partners.  In this regard it was, however, noted that the 
legal substance of a carried interest arrangement does not automatically prevail over its 
legal form.  For this reason, it was explained, that in order to ensure that carried interest is 
taxed appropriately, in terms of paragraph (c), where the general partner objects against 
and appeals the assessment of the Commissioner, the Commissioner will require a court to 
confirm its assessment by overruling the legal form of a carried interest arrangement and 
giving effect to its legal substance and related paragraph (c) tax effects.  
 
In this respect, it was further explained, that for a court to overrule the legal form of a 
carried interest arrangement, the Commissioner would need to apply: 
 The simulation test successfully. That is, the court would need to be satisfied that 
the legal form of the carried interest arrangement was a deliberate disguise by the 
general partner and limited partners, in order to conceal the true nature of their 
transaction.  It was concluded that the Commissioner would likely have significant 
difficulty in successfully applying this test. 
 The label test successfully. That is, the court would need to be satisfied that 
characterisation of a carried interest arrangement according to its legal form, as a 
partnership profit sharing arrangement, was incorrect, because its legal form 
differed from its legal substance, this being a fee arrangement between the general 
partner and the limited partners.  It was concluded that the Commissioner would 
likely succeed in applying this test. 
 
It was concluded that paragraph (c) and case law are inadequate for the purposes of taxing 
carried interest as paragraph (c) and case law do not apply to the taxation of carried 
interest based on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement.  Thus, the 
Commissioner, in order to ensure that carried interest is taxed appropriately, in terms of 
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paragraph (c), where the general partner objects against and appeals the Commissioner’s 
assessment, will be required to resort to expensive and time consuming litigation in 
order for a court to confirm its assessment, by overruling the legal form of a carried 
interest arrangement, and giving effect to its legal substance and attendant paragraph (c) 
tax implications. 
 
Because paragraph (c) was identified as inadequate in the taxation of carried interest, it 
was recommended that a new provision, section 8D, be inserted into the Act to cater 
specifically for the taxation of carried interest.  More particularly, it was recommended 
that section 8D include in the income of the general partner of a private equity fund, the 
distribution of carried interest received, without any requirement that there be a link 
between the distribution received and services rendered, as is the case for paragraph (c) to 
apply to the taxation of the distribution.  It was explained that this would enable the 
distribution of carried interest, received by the general partner, to be taxed automatically in 
terms of section 8D, in accordance with its legal substance, as a fee received, 
notwithstanding the legal form of the carried interest arrangement.  In this way, the 
Commissioner would not need to resort to costly and time consuming litigation to ensure 
that carried interest is taxed appropriately, in accordance with its legal substance, as is 
currently the case with paragraph (c), in instances where the general partner objects and 
appeals the Commissioner’s assessment. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 2, the report analysed what carried interest is, how carried interest arises and 
how carried interest arrangements operate in South Africa.  Based on discussions with 
several persons active in the South African private equity industry, a review of a private 
equity fund partnership agreement and a private equity structure memorandum obtained 
from a large South African commercial law firm, it was found that private equity funds in 
South Africa most often take the form of an en commandite partnership, which partnership 
acquires investments in various portfolio companies.  Furthermore, there are two types of 
investor in South African private equity funds, each with very different economic roles; 
namely: 
 The limited partners which - as per Figure 1 of chapter 2 - contribute most 
(ordinarily 98% - 99%) of the fund’s capital (Dauds, 2008: 10-11).  The liability of 
these limited partners for debts of the fund is capped at their capital contributions, 
provided that they remain passive investors and their identities are not disclosed 
(SAVCA, 2015: 39). 
 The general partner, a company, which serves as the fund manager, and which 
contributes significantly less capital, typically only 1% - 2%, (refer Figure 1 of 
Chapter 2) to the fund (Missankov et al, 2006: 16 and Dauds, 2008: 10-11).  In 
sharp contrast to the limited partners, the general partner is the disclosed partner, 
and therefore bears unlimited liability risk in respect of fund debts (SAVCA, 2015: 
39).   Additionally, unlike the limited partners, the general partner takes an active 
role in managing the fund and is typically responsible for the identification, 
evaluation and negotiation of investment opportunities and the monitoring and 
realisation of those investments for the fund (Dauds, 2008: 10).  Notably, based on 
discussions with various private equity fund managers as well as tax practitioners 
that deal extensively with private equity transactions, most often, no fee is paid to 
the general partner for any fund management services performed.   
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Additionally, it was found that a typical private equity carried interest arrangement in 
South Africa operates on the basis that the general partner receives, as the distribution of 
carried interest, a disproportionate share of the proceeds that arise on disposal by the fund 
of a portfolio company (typically 20%), despite having contributed only 1% - 2% of the 
fund’s capital, provided certain performance conditions have been met (Dauds, 2008: 10-
11 and Missankov et al, 2006: 24-25). 
 
Chapter 3 discussed and scrutinised the relevant provisions in the Act and related case law 
that would likely apply to taxing both the right to carried interest, acquired by the general 
partner at fund inception, and the distribution of carried interest, received by the general 
partner. 
 
It was found that the legal form and associated tax implications of a carried interest 
arrangement differ from the arrangement’s legal substance and related tax implications.  
 
As regards the nature of the right to carried interest and the taxation thereof, it was found 
that: 
 In legal form, the right to carried interest is the right of the general partner to share 
disproportionately, relative to its capital contributed to the fund, in fund 
partnership profits.  Further, typically there is no link in the fund partnership 
agreement between the acquisition of this right and the fund management services 
that are required to be performed by the general partner, as per the fund partnership 
agreement.  
 
Based on its legal form, it was established that the right to carried interest is of a 
capital nature; being the right to future partnership profits, where the general 
partner is neither a dealer in carried interest rights, nor is the right acquired by the 
general partner in respect of services rendered / to be rendered by the general 
partner to the limited partners.  As a result, no tax liability arises in respect of the 
acquisition of the right because the general partner acquires, at fund inception, a 
right of a capital nature which constitutes neither gross income of the general 
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partner, nor a disposal event for capital gains tax purposes as per the Eighth 
Schedule. 
 
 In legal substance, the right to carried interest is a reward acquired by the general 
partner, at fund inception, from the limited partners for services to be rendered by 
the former to the latter.  It was established that because of the carried interest 
conditions, namely; the requirement to return to all fund investors their initial 
capital contributed to the fund and to achieve for all fund investors the hurdle rate 
of return on investment, before the distribution of carried interest is received, the 
general partner is not unconditionally entitled to the right at fund inception.   
 
Therefore, the right to carried interest does not accrue to the general partner at 
fund inception.  This means that paragraph (c) does not apply to the taxation of 
this right, as the right acquired does not constitute an amount accrued in respect of 
services rendered / to be rendered as contemplated by paragraph (c).  
Consequently, it was determined that no tax liability arises in respect of the 
acquisition by the general partner, at fund inception, of the right to carried interest. 
This is because there is no accrual of an amount to the general partner; thus no 
amount falls to be included in the general partner’s gross income, which would 
then be subject to tax. 
 
With respect to the nature of the distribution of carried interest and the taxation thereof, it 
was found that: 
 In legal form, the distribution of carried interest is the receipt by the general 
partner, subject to certain conditions being met, of a disproportionate share of 
portfolio company realisation proceeds, received in its capacity as partner.  As 
with the right to carried interest, typically there is no link in the fund partnership 
agreement between the distribution received and the fund management services to 
be performed by the general partner, in terms of the fund partnership agreement.  
Consequently, paragraph (c), which includes in gross income, inter alia, any 
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amount received in respect of services rendered, does not apply to the taxation of 
the distribution, based on its legal form. 
  
 Furthermore, in terms of section 9C(2), amounts received by a taxpayer in respect 
 of the  disposal of equity shares, held for a continuous period of at least three 
 years, are deemed to be of a capital nature.  Because the investments of private 
 equity funds tend to  be held for 5 to 8 years before being disposed (Financial 
 Mail, 2014: 50), it was established that proceeds received on disposal of a portfolio 
 company shareholding by a fund partnership, will, almost invariably, be deemed to 
 be of a capital nature in terms of section 9C(2). 
   
 In this regard, based on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement, it was 
 further  determined that section 9C(2) read with paragraph 36 of Eighth schedule 
 will apply in deeming the full portfolio company realisation proceeds, allocated 
 to the general  partner in terms of the fund partnership agreement, to be of a capital 
 nature.  This is because such realisation proceeds are an amount received by the 
 general partner in respect of its interest in the qualifying shares in a portfolio 
company, held by the tax transparent fund partnership
42
.  Furthermore, it was 
established that in terms of paragraph 20, the base cost of the general partner’s 
interest in the qualifying portfolio company shares, is the capital contributed by the 
general partner to the fund, which capital was used to acquire the general partner’s 
interest in these qualifying shares. 
 
 As a result, it was found, in section 3.2.3, that the general partner is subject to 
 capital gains tax at the effective capital gains tax rate of 18,67%, on a capital gain 
 determined as the difference  between the portfolio company realisation proceeds 
 received and the paragraph 20 base cost, of the general partner’s interest in the 
 qualifying portfolio company shares.  Notably, it was also found that because the  
         
                                                     
42
 Hereafter referred to as ‘the general partner’s interest in the qualifying portfolio company shares’ 
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 distribution of carried interest is included in  the portfolio company realisation 
proceeds received by the general partner, the distribution is included in the gain that 
is subject to capital gains tax at the effective capital gains tax rate of 18,67%.  The 
tax implications of the distribution of carried interest, based on its legal form, are 
shown in Illustrative example 2 in section 3.2.3.  
 
 In legal substance, the distribution of carried interest is the receipt by the general 
partner of a fee from the limited partners for fund management services rendered 
by the former to the latter as well as for the service rendered to the limited partners 
of undertaking to accept third party unlimited liability risk for the debts of the 
partnership. It was found that paragraph (c) applies to the taxation of the 
distribution of carried interest received by the general partner; the distribution 
being an amount received in respect of services rendered, in terms of paragraph 
(c), by the general partner to the limited partners.  Further, it was established that 
paragraph (c), overrides section 9C in taxing the distribution of carried interest 
because paragraph (c) includes in gross income amounts that are of a capital 
nature.   
Consequently, it was found in section 3.2.5 that upon receipt of the portfolio 
company realisation proceeds by the general partner, the portion that comprises the 
distribution of carried interest will be included in the gross income of the general 
partner in terms of paragraph (c) and will be subject to normal tax at the rate of 
28%.  The tax implications of the distribution of carried interest, based on its legal 
substance, are shown in Illustrative example 3 in section 3.2.5. 
 
The chapter concluded that where a carried interest arrangement is taxed in accordance 
with its legal form, there will be no taxation of the right to carried interest acquired, this 
being the acquisition of a right of a capital nature to which paragraph (c) does not apply, 
while the distribution of carried interest received will, in terms of section 9C(2), be deemed 
to be proceeds of a capital nature and will be taxed upon receipt, in the hands of the 
general partner, at the effective capital gains tax rate of 18,67%.  
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Alternatively, where a carried interest arrangement is taxed in accordance with its legal 
substance, there will be no taxation of the right to carried interest acquired as there is no 
accrual of an amount in respect of this right acquired while the distribution of carried 
interest received will be included in the gross income of the general partner upon receipt in 
terms of paragraph (c) and will then be subject to normal tax at the higher tax rate of 28% 
in the hands of the general partner. 
 
Chapter 4 evaluated the appropriateness and adequacy of the existing taxing provisions in 
the Act and relevant case law principles for the purposes of taxing carried interest and 
made a recommendation for reform where the law was found wanting. 
 
It was found that paragraph (c) is appropriate for the purposes of taxing carried interest 
because it achieves the correct taxing result based on the legal substance of a carried 
interest arrangement.  That is, paragraph (c) taxes the distribution of carried interest, in 
accordance with its legal substance, as a fee received by the general partner, which is then 
subject to normal tax at the rate of 28% as is the case with any other form of compensation 
for services rendered.  In contrast to paragraph (c), it was found that section 9C is an 
inappropriate taxing provision for carried interest since it applies to deem the distribution 
of carried interest to be proceeds of a capital nature based on its legal form, and fails to tax 
the distribution based on its legal substance. 
 
It was also found that the Commissioner, in order to ensure that the distribution of carried 
interest is taxed in terms of paragraph (c) and thus appropriately, in the event that the 
general partner objects against and appeals the Commissioner’s assessment, will require a 
court to confirm its assessment, by overruling the legal form of a carried interest 
arrangement, and giving effect to its legal substance and related paragraph (c) tax effects.  
It was established that for a court to overrule the legal form of a carried interest 
arrangement, the Commissioner will need to apply either of the following tests 
successfully: 
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 The simulation test. That is, the court will need to be satisfied that the legal form of 
the carried interest arrangement is a deliberate disguise by the general partner and 
limited partners, in order to conceal the true nature of their transaction.  It was 
determined that the Commissioner will likely have significant difficulty in 
successfully applying this test. 
 The label test. That is, the court will need to be satisfied that characterisation of a 
carried interest arrangement according to its legal form, as a partnership profit-
sharing arrangement, is incorrect, because its legal form differs from its legal 
substance, this being a fee arrangement between the general partner and the limited 
partners. 
 
It was found, that paragraph (c) is inadequate for the purposes of taxing carried interest 
because paragraph (c) cannot be applied to the taxation of carried interest based on the 
legal form of a carried interest arrangement. This implies that in instances where the 
Commissioner’s assessment is objected to and appealed by the general partner, the 
Commissioner, to ensure that carried interest is taxed appropriately in terms of paragraph 
(c), is required to resort to costly and time consuming litigation in order for a court to 
confirm its assessment, by overruling the legal form of a carried interest arrangement and 
giving effect to its legal substance and associated paragraph (c) tax consequences. 
 
Because paragraph (c) was found to be inadequate for the purposes of taxing carried 
interest, it was recommended that a new provision, section 8D be inserted into the Act to 
cater specifically for the taxation of carried interest.  It was recommended that section 8D 
include in the income of the general partner of a private equity fund, the distribution of 
carried interest received, without any requirement that there be a link between the 
distribution of carried interest received and services rendered, as is the case for paragraph 
(c) to apply.  It was explained that this would enable the distribution of carried interest 
received by the general partner to be taxed appropriately, in accordance with its legal 
substance as a fee received, subject to normal tax at the rate of 28%, notwithstanding the 
legal form of a carried interest arrangement.  Consequently, the Commissioner would not 
have to resort to expensive and time consuming litigation, in order to ensure that 
carried interest was taxed appropriately, in accordance with its legal substance, as is 
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currently the case with paragraph (c) in circumstances where the general partner objects to 
and appeals the Commissioner’s assessment. 
 
 
In conclusion: 
 The law is appropriate for the purposes of taxing carried interest in South Africa 
because paragraph (c) taxes the distribution of carried interest in accordance with 
its legal substance, as a fee received for services rendered, which amount is 
included in the gross income of the general partner.  This means that the correct 
taxing result is obtained because the fee received is then subject to normal tax at 
the rate of 28% as is the case with any other type of remuneration for services 
rendered. 
 The law is, however, inadequate for the purposes of taxing carried interest in 
South Africa because paragraph (c) and case law do not apply to the taxation of 
carried interest based on the legal form of a carried interest arrangement, where in 
legal form, both the right to carried interest and the distribution of carried interest 
are not acquired / received as remuneration for services rendered.  As a result, in 
instances where the general partner objects to and appeals the Commissioner’s 
assessment, the Commissioner is then required to litigate the matter, which is both 
costly and time consuming, in order for a court to confirm its assessment, which 
confirmation involves the court overruling the legal form of the carried interest 
arrangement and giving effect to the legal substance of the arrangement and its 
associated paragraph (c) tax implications.  
 A recommendation has therefore been made to insert a new section 8D into the Act 
which, it is submitted, would address the inadequacy of existing law in taxing 
carried interest. This is because section 8D would tax the distribution of carried 
interest appropriately, in accordance with its legal substance as a fee received by 
the general partner, subject to normal tax at 28%, notwithstanding the legal form 
of the distribution.  In this way, the Commissioner would not need to resort to 
costly and time consuming litigation to ensure that carried interest is taxed 
appropriately, in accordance with its legal substance, as is currently the case with 
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paragraph (c), in instances where the general partner objects to and appeals the 
Commissioner’s assessment. 
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